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Abstract
The research goal involved developing improved methods for securing Pro-
grammable Logic Controller (PLC) devices against unauthorized entry and miti-
gating the risk of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) attack by
detecting malicious software and/or trojan hardware. A Correlation Based Anomaly
Detection (CBAD) process was developed to enable 1) software anomaly detec-
tion–discriminating between various operating conditions to detect malfunctioning
or malicious software, firmware, etc., and 2) hardware component discrimination–
discriminating between various hardware components to detect malfunctioning or
counterfeit, trojan, etc., components.
Defense against software exploitation was implemented by 1) adopting a previ-
ously demonstrated capability that provides human-like discrimination of hardware
devices using information extracted from intentional Radio Frequency (RF) emis-
sions, and 2) adapting an RF-based verification methodology to exploit information
in unintentional PLC emissions to detect anomalous operation resulting from soft-
ware and/or hardware discrepancies and enhance SCADA security. Operational
status verification (normal versus anomalous) is demonstrated using experimentally
collected emissions from ten Allen Bradley SLC-500 PLCs executing custom Ladder
Logic Programs (LLPs) designed to support the research methodology.
Performance for verification-based software anomaly detection was evaluated
using the CBAD process. The CBAD verification process is sequence agnostic and
can be used with untransformed Time Domain (TD) or transformed inputs, including
those derived from untransformed TD, Hilbert transform (HT), and RF Distinct
Native Attribute (RF-DNA) features. Relative to performance using untransformed
TD sequences or RF-DNA features, CBAD performance using HT sequences was
superior with an arbitrary Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve Equal
xv
Error Rate (EER) benchmark of EERB≤10.0% achieved for all PLC devices at a
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) of SNR=0.0 dB; this benchmark was not achieved for
any PLCs using untransformed TD sequences or RF-DNA features.
Performance for verification-based hardware anomaly detection was evaluated
using a Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantized-Improved (GRLVQI) pro-
cess with two input sequences, including one derived from TD RF-DNA features
(NDim=156 dimensions) and one from Correlation Domain (CD) features (NDim=10
dimensions). For this assessment, ten Allen Bradley PLCs were divided into autho-
rized/authentic and rogue/unknown groups containing five devices each. The GR-
LVQI model was trained using sequences from all authentic devices and each device
in the unknown group was presented for verification against each of the authentic
devices (25 total anomaly assessments). The GRLVQI anomaly detection capability
was assessed using each of the two input sequence types and resultant performance
was comparable. At SNR=15.0 dB an average EER≈1.3% was achieved for TD
sequences as compared to an average EER≈1.6% for the CD sequences; both se-
quence types satisfied the EERB≤10.0% benchmark for all PLC devices. While the
EER value for TD sequences is 0.3% lower than CD sequences, the TD sequence
has nearly 16 times the number of elements as the CD sequence and a correspond-
ingly greater amount of computational resources would be required in an operational
implementation.
xvi
RADIO FREQUENCY BASED
PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER
ANOMALY DETECTION
1. Introduction
This chapter introduces the research topic and outlines the motivation behind
the development of the Correlation Based Anomaly Detection (CBAD) process de-
scribed in later chapters. Section 1.1 provides a brief overview of the operational
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Industrial Control System
(ICS) topology and vulnerabilities. It is further divided into two subsections: 1) Sec-
tion 1.1.1 describing the software-based vulnerability picture for SCADA/ICS and
2) Section 1.1.2 describing the potential for hardware-based security concerns. Sec-
tion 1.2 provides a brief description of existing research and technologies supporting
the current research effort. Section 1.3 provides a summary of the existing research
and technologies contributions.
1.1 Operational Motivation
Modern digital computing technology has led to a proliferation of computers
to nearly every aspect of daily operations for the United States Air Force (USAF)
and Department of Defense (DOD) as a whole. The modern US military is critically
dependent on computer hardware and digital communication systems to successfully
carry out their mission from checking email to ordering needed maintenance parts.
The advantages in efficiency through use of networked Information Technology (IT)
resources brings with it the cost of increased vulnerability to malicious cyber attacks.
The Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team (AFCERT) is the primary
agency responsible for protecting USAF network assets from attack. The AFCERT
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reported nearly 2 million weekly alerts indicating potential cyber attacks against
USAF bases in the month of November, 2011 [99], highlighting the magnitude of
cyber threats facing networked IT systems. In addition to the potential attacks,
there have been over 150 verified incidents of “hackers” gaining access to information
system assets affecting the USAF mission in 2011 [99]. The threat of attack and
compromise of USAF information system assets directly affects nearly all aspects of
the USAF mission.
A key aspect of information systems usage is the communication systems link-
ing devices and networks. Data exchange occurs over computer networks (wired
and wireless) as well as over civilian communication networks (i.e., cellular/satellite
phone networks). The analysis and storage of potentially sensitive data is reliant,
to a large extent, on Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) products either slightly
modified for military use or not altered at all. In order to ensure proper control
and verification of the data relevant to the military mission, it is essential that the
devices used to manage the data are trusted. Various vulnerabilities exist in the
communication systems and data processing hardware currently used in military ap-
plications. Although methods exist to protect hardware and communication signals
from exploitation, such as Anti-Tamper (AT) initiatives for hardware and data en-
cryption for communication systems, these methods are not sufficient to guarantee
the authenticity of computing platforms, programs, or communication nodes.
Another, less publicized, area of concern involves hardware-based vulnerabil-
ities. The focus on cheaper semiconductor devices, such as those at the core of
SCADA Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), has led to a heavy reliance on
overseas manufacturing that results in a greater risk of potentially damaging trojan
or counterfeit devices being deliberately used on PLC devices in critical applica-
tions [17,82]. For example, the DOD implemented a ban on the use of thumb drives
following concerns regarding virus transmission via the flash drive medium [8]. Mil-
itary Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) systems are prone to exploitation
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given their reconfigurable nature. Even Integrated Circuits (ICs) fabricated for US
military use are vulnerable given the majority of manufacturing facilities are located
overseas. Although research has been focused towards combating the threat of hard-
ware and communication vulnerabilities [53,69,70,90], the verification of a hardware
platform, program, or communication node is critical to protecting and validating
the data used in carrying out every aspect of the USAF military mission.
Information Technology systems have also yielded unprecedented levels of au-
tomated, precise control of ICS operations for functions from waste water treatment
to nuclear power generation. ICS facilities maintain critical infrastructure capabili-
ties in the civilian and Government sectors. US Government policy states “Private
business, government, and the national security apparatus increasingly depend on
an interdependent network of critical physical and information infrastructures, in-
cluding telecommunications, energy, financial services, water, and transportation
sectors” [98]. Current ICS architectures are predominantly based on networked
digital computers that enable reliable monitoring and control of critical functions
within regionally localized and globally distributed operations [84]. One key ele-
ment of the ICS operation are SCADA systems. These provide centralized control
and monitoring via PLC devices, which are the gateway through which recent cy-
ber attacks have been orchestrated against high-profile ICS targets [95, 105]. The
majority of publicized attacks target software-based vulnerabilities to inflict dam-
age [12,13,33,44,60,93,94]. While the software vulnerabilities may lie within a PLC
or other SCADA component, PLCs represent the last component to operationally
implement kinetic effects caused by a cyber attack.
With such reliance on the critical functions performed by ICS assets and fa-
cilities, the SCADA and PLC systems employed must be secured from cyber attack
similar to how major IT systems are currently protected and secured. Unfortunately,
there exists a gap between the security options for ICS assets and IT systems. PLCs
tend to be specific purpose machines and often are out-dated by IT standards. There
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Figure 1.1: OSI 7-layer network model [7].
is not an availability of applications available for the PLCs aside from the applica-
tions needed to perform their specific tasks. There needs to be a method of detecting
altered or anomalous activity on SCADA and PLC hardware to thwart adversarial
attacks.
Consider the Open Systems Interconnect (OSI) model describing the differ-
ent levels of a system [106] shown in Fig. 1.1. The current focus on detection of
unauthorized or anomalous activity on information systems is through analysis of
the data within the Application (Layer 1) or Network (Layer 5) layers of the model.
In communication systems such as cellular phone systems and wireless networking,
data access and trust relationships are commonly verified via verification methods
operating in the Data Link Layer (Layer 2) of the OSI model. These verification cre-
dentials include Media Access Control (MAC) addresses for wireless network access
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and International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) numbers for cellular networks.
These verification methods are far from foolproof. There exist tools and methods
allowing an individual to modify the verification credentials, allowing adversaries to
bypass the Data Link Layer control measures all together [61, 73, 104]. IT networks
employ firewalls and network Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) components to de-
tect and block cyber attacks. IT systems employ virus detection and host-based IDS
programs to perform similar functions at the individual computer level. SCADA
and PLC systems are special purpose machines and do not have the general purpose
capabilities of most desktop or server computers in the IT realm. Additionally, it is
not uncommon to see ICS components, to include PLCs, installed and in operation
for decades. These PLCs do not have the functionality to run the virus detection or
IDS programs. This exposes the system to threats that have the potential to enact
substantial physical losses as in the case of StuxNet or the Springfield attacks.
The following sections address the research motivation in light of two primary
attack vectors used to exploit PLC vulnerabilities, including 1) Section 1.1.1 which
addresses software-based vulnerabilities, and 2) Section 1.1.2 which addresses hard-
ware-based vulnerabilities.
1.1.1 Software-Based Vulnerabilities. Network and computer security ex-
perts at McAfee predict 2013 will bring a shift in the cyber warfare picture that
includes increased activity in nation state’s becoming victims and targets of cyber
attacks [63]; McAfee suggests improving SCADA system defense by removing them
from the production network and placing them on a dedicated stand-alone network.
The motivation for removing SCADA systems from the production network is due in
part to the number of potential high-value critical infrastructure ICS targets (civilian
and military) using SCADA control via an unsecure network. The Air Force Civil
Engineering Center (AFCEC) states that ICS assets in the USAF and in industry
are “at best insufficiently protected from cyber threats” [100]. In acknowledgement
of the criticality of US ICS infrastructure, the US Government has prioritized the
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defense of these vulnerable assets through a Presidential Directive in 2003 [5] and
more recently through an Executive Order in 2013 [66]. Despite the focus on pro-
tecting ICS assets from malicious activity, they still remain vulnerable. Over 20
vulnerability alerts and advisories have been issued from the ICS Cyber Emergency
Response Team (ICS-CERT) in January of 2013 alone [46]. Therefore, protecting
vital ICS assets from the risk of cyber attack is essential and is a key component
used to mitigate the potential catastrophic consequences if an attack occurs.
SCADA systems typically monitor and control higher-level systems through
field-based devices called Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) or PLCs that physically
implement desired functionality. A PLC is a special purpose computer that per-
forms low-level ICS functions, such as collecting sensor data and operating physical
valves or switches [84]. While the PLC Operating System (OS) and communication
protocols are often proprietary, most current PLCs have the ability to operate on a
standard network. It is through these networks that malicious programs are loaded
onto vulnerable PLCs. A majority of electronic devices, including Personal Com-
puters (PCs) and network components, are protected to some degree from cyber
attacks through a variety of intrusion detection and/or anti virus programs. This
is in sharp contrast to PLC implementations, which have very limited protection
options due to proprietary design, limited processing power, and limited memory
that precludes direct use of standard PC and network anti virus programs [82]. Ad-
ditionally, many PLCs remain in service for decades due to the prohibitive cost of
re-engineering SCADA systems. Thus, PLCs become obsolete and unsupportable
relative to IT standards and capabilities that continually evolve to satisfy consumer
demands preventing the implementation of typical “bit-level” IT protective measures
in PLC devices. ICS facilities remain vulnerable to cyber attack as evidenced by re-
cently successful Stuxnet malware-based attack [105]. More recently, sophisticated
programs including ICS specific malware, such as Duqu and Flame, demonstrate a
continued need for SCADA and ICS defensive research. These malware programs
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contain computer code that targets SCADA and ICS functions through vulnerable
components [12,13,93,105]. Consequently, there is a vital need to implement a pro-
cess to detect malicious code installed on PLCs before the code can execute and
cause irreversible, catastrophic effects.
1.1.2 Hardware-Based Vulnerabilities. In addition to the high-profile soft-
ware-based attacks, concern also exists regarding hardware-based compromise or-
chestrated through trojan or counterfeit semiconductor or Integrated Circuit (IC)
devices. Semiconductor devices are prevalent and form the core of all computer sys-
tems in use today including those related to SCADA systems and ICS infrastructure.
Systems relying on secure semiconductor and IC devices are integrated within ICS
facilities and in use throughout DOD to process, store, and protect sensitive infor-
mation remain vulnerable to tampering by adversaries. Not all forms of attacks are
malicious in nature. Counterfeit, used, or sub-standard quality devices can fail in
critical applications, causing similar damage compared to a malicious attack. The
general term component substitution can be used to refer to the substitution of a
genuine, trusted component with a counterfeit, substandard, or trojan component.
This substitution can be made during manufacture, assembly, transport or even af-
ter operational deployment. Unfortunately, most organizations in the DOD do not
have the means to defend against counterfeit or trojan component substitution [4].
Estimates of the losses due to counterfeit semiconductor devices are staggering. The
losses are estimated at approximately $200B USD with about 10.0% of electronic
parts in use being counterfeit substitutions [65]. The intent of substitution varies
from malicious exploitation of DOD systems to increasing company profits by using
cheaper components. To combat the proliferation of potentially harmful IC devices
in DOD applications, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is
attempting to combat potential trojans in DOD ICs manufactured in foreign coun-
tries as part of the Trusted IC program [17]. This program is technologically in its
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infancy. Additional work is required to verify IC authenticity using non-destructive,
non-disruptive techniques that enable device verification during operation.
1.2 Technical Motivation
Traditional bit-level intrusion detection and anti virus programs monitor activ-
ity and assess system status using information in higher layers of the OSI model [106].
One possible solution is to change the focus of detection from the Application (APP)
and Network (NWK) layers to the Physical (PHY) layer. Detection of anomalous
activity in the Physical layer is dependent on the analysis of physical attributes of the
system operation, such as power consumption, heat, or Radio Frequency (RF) radi-
ation from a specific ICS device. Research efforts have proposed one such method of
detecting the anomalous behavior due to the presence of trojan hardware contained
in an IC package using Side Channel Analysis (SCA) methods to capture signals from
the outputs of the ICs [2]. This method could potentially be extended to identify and
categorize the operation of a known device. Although this method provided positive
results, it requires exercising all of the expected operations in order to effectively
identify the operations. Additionally, the IC would need to be isolated to minimize
effects of other components on the same circuit board. Other research efforts have
used a method of detecting anomalous operations through power analysis [28, 29].
Using a non-contact Electro-Magnetic (EM)-based instantaneous current probe, the
operating current is captured and used to estimate the power usage of the IC. The
probe must be placed at the power trace for the IC in question, which could change
for different implementations. Variations in power usage based on the variations in
IC manufacture, device temperature, and other components drawing power from the
same power trace can complicate the measure of current draw for the targeted IC.
What is needed is a validation method that does not require removal of the IC and
can non-destructively analyze the operations while limiting interference from other
system components. Detection and classification of devices and device operations
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based on RF attributes and qualities have been successfully demonstrated in a large
body of research [9, 11, 14–16, 18, 19, 21, 23–25, 27, 34, 39, 42, 49, 77, 79, 81, 103]. The
use of attributes from the RF emissions provides a means of detecting anomalous
activity on a wide range of systems without the limitations imposed by the lack of
PLC IDS and Anti Virus (AV) program capabilities. One proposed method of veri-
fying the identity of either a communication node or a hardware platform is through
collection, analysis, and classification of the RF energy emitted by the device. RF
Fingerprinting can be used to generate unique IDs for a given device based on its
physical attributes. A key advantage to RF Fingerprints is the relative difficulty
in spoofing or altering the RF Fingerprint for a device as compared to spoofing or
altering the network or hardware credentials.
At the core of PLCs (and most information systems technologies) are semi-
conductor IC devices. There are potential variabilities in materials, processes, and
environmental variables involved the semi-conductor manufacturing process. These
variances result in physical differences in IC devices even if the devices are designed
to be equivalent. Device testing limits the variance in devices sold to consumers by
testing to ensure the functional characteristics of the devices are within a defined
tolerance. Functional testing is a well researched and developed field [1, 54, 55].
Functional testing is generally limited to verifying the device outputs are correct
for the expected clock timing and voltage levels variance. Within the tolerance are
variances in performance that can be detected and quantified using specific test
equipment. The idea of Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attributes (RF-DNA) is
based on capturing, analyzing, and quantifying variance in RF emissions related to
variances in manufactured semi-conductor devices. The term RF “fingerprint” is
used to describe the RF-DNA values associated with a specific device.
RF fingerprints can be derived from two broad categories of RF emissions,
including Intentional RF Emissions (IRE) and Unintentional RF Emissions (URE).
Substantial research has been conducted using RF energy attributes to produce
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RF fingerprints for device verification [6, 11, 35, 37, 38, 57, 58, 75, 80, 91, 92, 97]. IRE
describes RF energy that is intentionally broadcast as part of a device’s function.
Examples of devices that broadcast IRE include wireless radios, IEEE 802.15 Blue-
tooth devices, cellular phones, and IEEE 802.11 WiFi networking devices. While
wireless communication devices make use of IRE to perform their primary function,
digital hardware devices also have URE related to the logic switching in the device.
URE describes RF energy that is unintentionally broadcast during device operation.
The URE is not beneficial to device operation and is considered a detriment as it
can interfere with normal operations. The operation of clock signals for IC circuits
is one contributor to the broadcast of URE from IC-based devices.
RF fingerprints have been used to identify and verify devices. The identification
of a device is a means of comparing a single RF fingerprint to a set of established
fingerprints and “classifying” the device as one of the previously analyzed devices
based on a comparison of the RF fingerprints. This is a one-to-many comparison
problem, meaning a single fingerprint is compared to multiple classified fingerprints
in order to properly identify the device. The verification of a device is a means
of comparing a single RF fingerprint to a single previously captured and analyzed
fingerprint and determining to what extent the two fingerprints are similar. This is a
one-to-one comparison problem meaning a single fingerprint is compared to a single
classified fingerprint in order to verify the device.
The following sections provide a brief overview of previous efforts in the field
of RF fingerprints for the purpose of classification and verification for both IRE and
URE RF signal responses.
1.2.1 Emission Collection. The use of Physical layer RF characteristics to
classify and verify wireless devices or operations has been well researched [6,25,36,
38, 58, 59, 68, 92, 96, 97, 102, 103]. Regardless of emission type (IRE or URE) being
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considered, RF fingerprinting and device classification generally involves a basic 5-
step process that includes [79,91]:
1. Signal Collection
2. Burst Detection
3. Feature Extraction
4. RF Fingerprint Generation
5. Device Classification
Each step of the process is tailored to the wireless technology and device char-
acteristics of the Device Under Test (DUT) as specified in the device design speci-
fications. The generic classification process provides a starting point for using RF
emissions to discriminate between devices or operations.
The subject of using Physical layer RF characteristics to classify and verify
URE devices has not been as well researched as the IRE case. There has been
research and work focused on leveraging differences in output signals from ICs to
verify authenticity of the physical design, but they do not consider URE RF signals
from the device itself [2, 53]. Recent research efforts provided some of the initial
work in the field of capturing the RF signals from the IC DUTs for the purpose of
classification and verification [10,11] differing from the IRE process primarily in the
collection portion of the process.
The targeted RF signals for URE device exploitation differ from IRE device
exploitation in that there is no specified design for the signal as there are for wireless
broadcast standards. Additionally, the URE signal is not intentionally broadcast and
so the average signal power is significantly lower than that of an IRE signal. The
signal is collected using an RF probe instead of an antenna. The collection specifics
and configuration (such as bandwidth and target frequency) are largely determined
by the DUT clock frequency and empirically developed based on observation of
captured RF signals.
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1.2.2 Fingerprint Generation. Once the signal for an IRE or URE DUT
has been collected, sampled, filtered, and stored, the fingerprint generation step of
the process is performed. The specific fingerprint generation process considered is
that used for AFIT’s RF-DNA work [10, 58, 79, 103]. The fingerprint generation is
largely device agnostic in that regardless of whether the signal is based on collection
against an IRE or URE DUT, the high-level methods used to generate the fingerprint
are identical. Changes to the process are limited to configuration of the tools used
to generate the fingerprints.
The fingerprints are based on statistical attributes of signal characteristics such
as amplitude, frequency, and/or phase. The statistical attributes include standard
deviation, variance, skewness, and kurtosis. Prior to the calculation of the signal
characteristics and statistical attributes, a variety of transforms can be performed
on the collected, sampled discrete signal dependent on the DUT signal qualities.
1.2.3 Device Classification. A majority of existing RF fingerprints research
involves the classification of the DUT based on previously examined data sets. The
process involves analyzing RF fingerprints for known devices. The fingerprints from
the known devices are used to train software known as a classifier. In essence, the
training establishes fingerprint characteristics aligning an unknown DUT fingerprint
to a previously established device class based on the results of the training process.
Classification of devices is a one-to-many comparison that typically leads to a
DUT being classified as one of the available known devices. The research goal is to
verify a PLC is operating “normally”. One of the difficulties in classification is to
define linear (when possible) or non-linear boundaries separating class fingerprints
with a certain degree of accuracy. The problem of verifying a PLC is operating
normally can be tackled as a two-class problem: normal operating condition class
or anomalous operating condition class. It is easier to define a linear boundary
for a two-class problem than a multi-class problem. However, a more direct and
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simpler solution may be the use of verification instead of classification for the goal
of monitoring PLCs for anomalous activity.
1.2.4 Device ID Verification. One goal for capturing RF emissions and
extracting RF fingerprints is to verify a device’s bit-level ID; this is related to device
verification which is commonly used for granting network access. Verification is a
one-to-one comparison of an unknown DUT fingerprint to a known device fingerprint
with a goal of determining if the unknown DUT is the known device. This process
can be compared to using a photo identification card to verify an individual’s identity.
Using RF fingerprints for DUT ID verification is not as well researched as
using RF fingerprints for device classification. Previous research efforts were able to
demonstrate the use RF fingerprints to verify PIC microcontroller semi-conductor
devices [11] and wireless devices [76]. The process of comparing RF fingerprints to
verify a device’s ID parallels the procedures used for biometric human ID verification.
Biometric classification and verification provides a well-established framework that
is well-suited to the challenge of verifying PLC operations [48].
Following the general biometric verification process using RF fingerprints, pre-
vious researchers were able to accurately verify specific PIC microcontroller devices
with better than 99.5% accuracy [11]. This success highlights the potential appli-
cability for using verification-based methods to assess PLC device operational state
(normal or anomalous).
1.2.5 Correlation and Matched Filtering. Previous RF fingerprinting pro-
cesses relied heavily on classification methods. While effective, the implementation
of these classification methods can become computationally expensive for a large
number of classes and/or RF fingerprint characteristics. Yet, work continues and
there exists multiple efforts aimed at quantifying and reducing the computational
complexity of classification processes [3, 43]. The complexity of classification pro-
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cesses is of concern when implementing the processes on information systems with
limited processing power such as mobile platforms or systems with power constraints.
One potential alternative to approaching the problem involves using relatively
simple correlation-based methods for classification. Correlation is a key function
that is commonly used in optimal implementations of matched filtering for estimat-
ing digital communication symbols [72, 85]. Additionally, the correlation function
has found use in image processing and other fields requiring identification of sig-
nals where signal noise may be an issue [20]. Correlation is conceptually a straight
forward function with a well-defined complexity. Correlation provides an attrac-
tive alternative for classification given its simplicity and predictable computational
complexity.
1.3 Research Contributions
The research goal involved expanding the knowledge base of Physical layer
methods being developed to reliably detect anomalous and/or malicious activity
within ICS components. Specifically, the research objectives included developing
a general verification-based anomaly detection approach to support both 1) soft-
ware anomaly detection-discriminating between various operating conditions to de-
tect malfunctioning or malicious software, firmware, etc., and 2) hardware component
discrimination-discriminating between various hardware components to detect mal-
functioning or counterfeit, trojan, etc. ICs. As summarized in Table 1.1, AFIT
research contributions in the Radio Frequency Intelligence (RFINT) field have been
made in several technical areas. Previously undefined acronyms that are used in
the table include: Time Domain (TD), Spectral Domain (SD), Correlation Domain
(CD), Multiple Discriminant Analysis/Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML), General-
ized Relevance Learning Vector Quantized-Improved (GRLVQI), and Learning From
Signals (LFS).
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1.4 Document Organization
The remaining chapters are organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides back-
ground information regarding SCADA and ICS systems, PLCs, Ladder Logic Pro-
grams (LLPs), network/PLC vulnerabilities, spurious RF signal collection, post-
collection processing, the correlation operation, the Hilbert transform, and device
verification. Chapter 3 provides details on the methodology used for this research
effort including signal collection and processing, the CBAD process, the RF-DNA
process, the specific devices and LLPs used for this research, and the verification
metrics presented to measure performance. Chapter 4 presents the results of the
methodologies from Chapter 3 including verification performance for CBAD and
RF-DNA processes for (TD) and Hilbert transformed waveforms. Chapter 5 pro-
vides a summary of the research results and potential future research efforts.
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Table 1.1: Relational mapping between RFINT Technical Areas in Previous related
work and Current AFIT research contributions. The × symbol denotes specific areas
addressed.
Technical Area Previous Work Current Research
Addressed Ref # Addressed Ref #
TD Features × [57, 58,76,77] ×
[91, 92,102,103] [86–89]
SD Features × [10, 11,81,103]
CD Features × [91, 92] × [86–89]
Emission Type
Intentional (IRE) ×
[57, 58,76,81]
[91, 92,102,103]
[21,39,40,42]
Unintentional (URE) × [9–11] × [86–89]
Burst ×
[57, 58,76,81]
[91, 92,102,103]
[21,39,40,42]
Continuous × [9–11] × [86–89]
High SNR ×
[57, 58,76,81]
[91, 92,102,103]
[21,39,40,42]
Low SNR × [9–11] × [86–89]
Classification/Verification Processes
MDA/ML ×
[57, 58,77,81]
[91, 92,102,103]
[9–11,21]
GRLVQI × [57, 58,77,81] ×
LFS × [39–42]
Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA)
MDA/ML × [39, 57,58,77,81]
GRLVQI × [56, 77,81] ×
LFS × [39–42]
Verification
Electronic Components × [9–11] × [89]
Authorized Wireless Devices × [21, 77,81]
Rogue Wireless Devices × [21, 77,81]
Device Operations × [86–88]
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2. Background
This chapter provides background information on the topics associated with the
research in support of developing a single verification-based anomaly detection ap-
proach supporting: 1) software anomaly detection-discriminating between various
operating conditions to detect malfunctioning or malicious software, firmware, etc.,
and 2) hardware component discrimination-discriminating between various hardware
components to detect malfunctioning or counterfeit, trojan, etc. Integrated Circuits
(ICs). For the purpose of the research, verification is the validation of a claimed
identity for either an operating condition or hardware component.
Section 2.1 provides background on Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) and Industrial Control System (ICS) and outlines the relationship be-
tween Programmable Logic Control (PLC) devices and the Ladder Logic Programs
(LLPs) used to control them. Section 2.2 provides background related to SCADA
and ICS vulnerabilities. Section 2.3 outlines the general emission collection and
post-collection processing used for Time Domain (TD) signals. Section 2.4 provides
a description of the two primary signal processing methods implemented in the re-
search, including correlation in Sect. 2.4.1 and the Hilbert transform in Sect. 2.4.2.
The chapter concludes with Sect. 2.5 which provides details on the verification-based
anomaly detection process and Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve met-
rics used for quantifying verification process performance.
2.1 SCADA and ICS Applications
As used in this document, the term SCADA refers to the entire collection
of hardware, software, and network elements that directly support monitoring and
control of ICS functions and facilities. ICS functions and facilities include, but
are not limited to, manufacturing, power generation, waste-water treatment, and
transportation control. SCADA systems are constructed in a hierarchical manner
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with supervisory systems providing monitoring and top-down control of field devices,
such as PLCs and Remote Terminal Units (RTUs). Field devices are used to collect
telemetry, which may be used to control field device operations or transmitted to a
Human Machine Interface (HMI) for observation and recording. PLC functionality
is controlled through LLPs which are computer programs written in a PLC specific
programming environment. While HMIs play an important part in overall SCADA
functionality and operation, PLCs and their controlling LLPs were the focus of this
research effort.
2.1.1 Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). PLC devices are used to im-
plement low-level functions within a SCADA system. At the simplest level, PLCs
collect various sensor inputs, run LLP operations using the input values, and as-
sign outputs based on the program results. A PLC device is typically comprised of
a microprocessor/microcontroller, associated Random Access Memory (RAM) and
firmware for executing the LLPs, input connections for collecting sensor data, out-
put connections for controlling physical electro-mechanical devices (relays, valves,
motors, etc.), and communication connections for interfacing with other devices or
for direct human interaction.
Relative to current main-stream Information Technology (IT) products, the
microprocessor, RAM, and firmware used in a majority of currently deployed PLCs
are outdated and lagging in performance. Thus, they are not capable of execut-
ing programs such Host-based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) software that is
commonly used in IT applications to provide internal defense against malicious or
unauthorized programs. PLCs are installed within a variety of physical environments
that prioritize robustness over computational capability and require relatively simple
hardware with demonstrated reliability and resilience to harsh environmental effects.
The unique hardware of PLCs necessitates specially designed Operating System (OS)
software for interfacing between the hardware and the user-implemented LLPs. The
defensive security programs and processes that are commonly implemented in tradi-
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tional IT systems are not applicable to PLCs due to the hardware differences between
traditional IT systems and PLCs [82]. Thus, SCADA field devices do not benefit
from a large body of research and technologies aimed at improving IT security.
2.1.2 Ladder Logic Program (LLP). LLP implementation allows users to
control the processing of PLC inputs and outputs. The LLP language is unique to the
PLC/SCADA environment and is largely based on the physical design of relays that
were used prior to introducing PLCs to control ICS functionality. Figure 2.1 shows
an example of an LLP as programmed in the Allen Bradley RSLogix R⃝ programming
environment consisting of Move (MOV) and Square Root (SQR) LLP operations. As
presented, these programs are structured as inputs on the left and operations/outputs
on the right. Apart from branching capability that is inherently supported in PLCs,
the LLPs fundamentally operate in sequential order. For the PLC devices considered
under this research, the execution of experimental LLPs was strictly sequential with
no recursive calls or nested function included; this ensured that PLC operation was
deterministic and that resultant research conclusions were based on experimentally
repeatable execution.
Figure 2.1: Representative LLP constructed in the Allen Bradley RSLogix R⃝ pro-
gramming environment consisting of a single MOV and SQR operation. Program
rungs in the ladder are executed sequentially from left-to-right, top-to-bottom.
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LLP programs are inherently repetitive, with each repeated execution cycle
beginning at the top LLP rung and ending at the last program rung. Each execution
of the LLP is called a scan. For each LLP scan, the inputs are all processed and read
into memory first. The outputs are then logically computed and stored in internal
registers based on the logic of the LLP. The final step of the LLP scan is to assign
all computed outputs to the actual, physical outputs of the device. The PLC then
begins the next scan at the top rung of the LLP. While branches may exist in the
LLP, recursive calls or do-while loops are not permitted as the scan is fundamentally
a linear left-to-right, top-to-bottom, progression through the LLP.
2.1.3 Human Machine Interface (HMI). HMIs provide a means for users to
observe, monitor, and control ICS functions. HMIs are fundamentally software pack-
ages installed and executed on standard Personal Computers (PCs). HMI software is
programmed to interact with PLCs and other field devices through IT network media
using SCADA communication protocols such as the Object Linking and Embedding
(OLE) process control. While PLCs represent one means through which malicious
events can be physically enacted upon the system, the HMIs represent an easy means
for malicious software to be loaded onto victim PLCs [12, 13, 93, 94]. For example,
attacks similar to Stuxnet obfuscate the operator’s view of the victim PLC status
by using altered LLPs that replace legitimate LLPs stored on the PLC [105]. De-
spite the vulnerability, HMIs remain essential and provide valuable insight into ICS
facility functions by assimilating data from various Remote Terminal Units (RTUs)
and PLCs and presenting it in a customizable format to ICS facility operators.
While HMIs pose a potential vulnerability, the fact that a majority of the HMIs
are built from standard IT components significantly mitigates the threat. Widely
available IT security programs, tools, and methods are applicable to the majority of
HMI systems. Additionally, the communication networks consist of Commercial Off
The Shelf (COTS) IT devices and protocols. There may be proprietary protocols
operating between field devices, but these protocols typically operate over standard
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IT infrastructure and can be monitored for potentially destructive activity similar
to how standard protocols are monitored [64].
2.2 SCADA and ICS Vulnerabilities
SCADA and ICS systems remain vulnerable to a variety of attacks and methods
of compromise. The ICS Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) maintains a
list of hundreds of vulnerabilities specifically affecting SCADA and ICS components
and systems [45]. The vulnerabilities affect multiple devices within the SCADA
hierarchy, including both PLCs and HMIs. HMI hardware implementations are
largely based on traditional IT systems and benefit from the substantial research in
IT network defense. HIDS programs offer a means to detect unauthorized programs
on HMI systems and Anti Virus (AV) software provides another avenue for detecting
and removing malicious code on traditional IT systems. As stated in Sect. 2.1.1,
PLCs are largely vulnerable in this respect due to a lack of defensive software or
methods inherent in their design. Malicious threats such as Stuxnet exploit this
vulnerability to inject malicious unknown code into SCADA systems.
The PLC field devices pose a particularly alarming threat due to the lack of
general purpose processing capability, proprietary nature of the devices, and the
long tech-refresh cycles for installed devices. The LLPs introduced in Sect. 2.1.2
are focused on providing industrial monitoring and control functions and are not
general purpose enough to effectively implement AV or IDS functions, leaving the
PLC devices vulnerable.
Extensive research effort has been applied to secure traditional Information
Technology (IT) systems and networks by controlling access and detecting malicious
programs, or malware, in the higher layers of the network Open Systems Intercon-
nect (OSI) model, i.e., the Data Link Layer (DLL) through the Application (APP)
layer. Bit-level credentials, such as Media Access Control (MAC) addresses and
International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) numbers control, control network
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access while AV and Intrusion Detection System (IDS) software protects IT systems
from malware. Had the IT protection methods been available for PLCs at the time
of attack, the adverse effects of Stuxnet [105] and Duqu [93] malware-based attacks
may have been mitigated. The programs offering defense of commodity IT assets
are generally not implementable on the majority of PLCs and other ICS components
within SCADA systems; therefore, the goal is to find alternative defense mechanisms
that can be implemented on PLCs and other ICS components that are currently vul-
nerable. One specific alternative has emerged that exploits Radio Frequency (RF)
emissions to achieve human-like discrimination of hardware devices using PHY Layer
information extracted from either unintentional or intentional RF emissions to aug-
ment bit-level network access control measures [11, 18,25,58,79,102].
2.3 RF Emission Collection
Signal collection is the process of capturing and storing the Device Under Test
(DUT) signal. The signal collection can either be accomplished using an antenna for
Intentional RF Emissions (IRE) exploitation or using an EM probe for Unintentional
Radiated Emanation (URE) exploitation. In either case, the equipment and process
must be tailored to the specific target and signal attributes desired. Previous RF-
based research can be broadly categorized based on the type of emission(s) exploited.
IRE energy comes from devices that intentionally broadcast or emit RF radiation in
support of their primary “by design” function (e.g., cellular phones, pagers, wireless
Local Area Network (LAN) adapters, etc. URE energy comes from devices that emit
RF radiation as an unintended by-product or “side-effect” of their primary function;
the majority of electrical Integrated Circuit (IC) components emit some amount of
RF radiation during the course of normal operation.
IRE RF signals are broadcast at a carrier frequency specified by the specific
design of the DUT broadcast technology. The carrier frequency is typically much
higher than the frequency bandwidth of the DUT RF signal [85]. For example IEEE
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802.15 Bluetooth communications, use the Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM
RF band residing at a carrier frequency of fC=2.4 GHz, but the Bluetooth signal has
a bandwidth of less than 500 MHz [47]). Signals sampled at the carrier frequency
of fC=2.4 GHz would require substantial storage and bandwidth if sampled and
stored at the Nyquist-Shannon criteria (sample frequency fS≥2fC). Therefore, the
signal is down-converted after initial capture to a lower frequency with lower storage
requirements. This down-converted signal meets the Nyquist-Shannon criteria for
the DUT RF signal adjusted to account for the carrier frequency.
For a collection against an IRE device, critical collection aspects include the
antenna used to receive the signal and the receiver used to format and store the
signal. Additionally, even with the same receiver, different signal technologies will
require different collection settings such as center frequency, filter bandwidth, sam-
pling rate, and signal gain. Storage and processing also require specific collection
methods and settings. Environmental conditions also have an effect on the collec-
tion as temperature and RF interference both impact captured signal. Previous RF
Fingerprinting efforts have taken steps to limit the environmental impact such as
operating the collection receiver from within a climate controlled automobile [25]
or performing the collections indoors [79]. Although an uncontrolled environment
presents a challenge to collecting IRE signals, other researchers have had success in
collection and fingerprinting in an operational test environment with limited or no
control over potential interference or environmental effects [34, 102].
Collecting against URE parallels the collection against IRE devices, but re-
quires different equipment and collection methods. There exists invasive and non-
invasive techniques for RF capture from URE devices. Given the goal of RF finger-
printing, to accurately identify hardware or operations, most collections will require
non-invasive collections. One method of non-invasively collecting a URE signal is
by using an Electro Magnetic (EM) probe. Previous related research has exploited
differences in electrical responses collected directly from various IC connecting pins
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(power, timing, control, data, etc.) to verify physical design authenticity [2, 28];
physical contact assessment. These methods are unlike RF-based method adopted
for this research whereby RF emissions are collected from operating ICs using a near-
field probe placed in close proximity to the DUT [11,52]; non-contact electromagnetic
assessment.
The RF signal must still be sampled for the purpose of storing and analyzing.
The signal characteristics are based on physical attributes of the DUT and not spec-
ified design, so the sampling rate is determined empirically by analyzing the signals
collected from the DUT. As in the case of IRE collection, the sampled signal may
be filtered by a Low Pass Filter (LPF) to increase the overall Signal-to-Noise Ratio
(SNR). Because the URE broadcast is not based on a specific design, the values for
the LPF are determined empirically based on the spectral characteristics of the DUT
URE RF signals. Another difference between the URE and IRE collection process is
the burst detection. The IRE signals considered are transmitted in bursts containing
well documented regions. The URE signals construction is an artifact of the oper-
ational design and it does not follow any structured arrangement or organization.
Therefore, much of the time range for the Region Of Interest (ROI) is determined
empirically based on visual examination of collected signals.
As mentioned previously, the equipment used to collect RF signals in support
of fingerprinting differ for specific collections. For example, the signal specific equip-
ment would include tuned antennas for IRE or EM detection equipment such as a
near field probe for URE collection. In addition to the equipment required to capture
the RF signals on the physical layer, the signal data must be collected and stored
for future processing.
The URE fingerprinting research field has less subject matter and research
than the IRE research field. There have been no less than four AFIT research
efforts in the field of IRE related to GSM, 802.11x, and 802.16 technologies. To the
best of the author’s knowledge there has only been one dedicated AFIT research
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effort related to the field of URE fingerprinting. Therefore, while the RF Signal
Intercept and Collection System (RFSICS) collection metrics referenced above span
multiple research efforts and wireless technologies, the AFIT-specific metrics for
URE Fingerprinting are obtained from the previous PIC microcontroller work [10].
For the collection of URE data, recent AFIT efforts have used a Riscure near-field
probe in place of an antenna for IRE and capture/store the data using a LeCroy
104-Xi-A Oscilloscope. A filter was implemented between the near-field probe and
the oscilloscope to filter signals greater than 1 GHz. Since URE devices do not
intentionally broadcast an RF signal at an advertised frequency, as is the case with
IRE devices, the data collection settings are based on clock cycles and empirical
results. The target PIC devices operate at a clock rate of 29.48 MHz. However, the
collection was performed at a sampling rate of 2.5 Gsps (satisfying Nyquist sampling
criteria for signals less than 1.25 GHz) in order to allow post-collection simulations
using the extra data [10].
2.3.1 Near-Field RF Probe. RF energy can be collected using a typical
far-field antenna (common for IRE collections) or in the near-field using a specific
variant called an RF probe (common for URE collections). The near-field RF probes
used for this research were manufactured by Riscure and composed of a tuned, cal-
ibrated conductive coil and low-noise amplifier. RF probe performance is primarily
characterized by its bandwidth and spatial resolution, where bandwidth represents the
frequency range over which the probe is sufficiently sensitive to collect RF emissions
of interest and spatial resolution is the physical area extent over which the probe
maintains this sensitivity.
2.3.2 Digital Sampling. A continuous, real-world signal contains an infinite
number of values between any two points in time and would require an infinite
amount of storage and processing power to analyze. Therefore, the continuous RF
signal broadcast from the DUT must be sampled for storage and analysis. Sampling
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involves converting the continuous signal to a discrete representation for storage and
analysis. The collection hardware is configured to sample the RF frequencies at a
sampling rate meeting the requirements of the Nyquist-Shannon theorem [67].
Following near-field probe collection, the analog emission responses are digi-
tally sampled for subsequent storage and post-collection processing. Under Nyquist
criteria, the collected analog response must be sampled at a rate of fs≥2×fM , where
fM is the maximum frequency extent of the RF response. For emissions collected
here, the maximum frequency extent was limited by placing an in-line RF filter be-
tween the Riscure near-field probe and the LeCroy oscilloscope (o’scope) used as the
receiver. The RF filter bandwidth is determined by the spectral points at which the
signal’s power (S) is attenuated by SA≤3.0dB.
In addition to sampling frequency fs, another critical aspect in the sampling
process is quantization of TD signal samples. Quantization involves mapping a con-
tinuous analog variable (collected RF emission) into a discrete digital variable. The
voltage range and bit-depth define the analog-to-digital mapping process. For exam-
ple, an input voltage range of V ∈[0, 2.55] V gets mapped to an 8-bit digital variable
and provides the ability to discern between 28=256 total discrete voltage levels in
quantization increments of q=2.55/(256 − 1)=0.01 V. The resultant mapping of a
continuous input voltage to a discrete variable inherently introduces quantization
error into the digitized sample values. The adverse effects of quantization error vary
with application and efforts using identical equipment as this research successfully
discriminated between hardware devices while experiencing no adverse quantization
effects [9–11]. Given this motivation, the effect of quantization error was not ad-
dressed or analyzed under this research. The specific bit-depth and sampling rate
implemented under this research are discussed in further detail in Chapter 3.
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2.4 Post-Collection Processing
The primary post-collection processing methods used for this research were
based on Correlation and the Hilbert transform. Collectively, these methods are the
basis of the Correlation-Based Anomaly Detection (CBAD) process that is intro-
duced under this research and serves as the core signal processing engine.
2.4.1 Correlation. The correlation processing used here extends beyond
traditional digital communication system applications and is more consistent with
what is commonly used in image processing and other fields requiring signal identifi-
cation in noisy environments [20]. Given two discrete complex-valued sequences x[n]
and y[n], the kth-lag element of the auto-correlation (Rxx[k]) and cross-correlation
(Rxy[k]) sequences are given by,
Rxx[k] =
∑
n
xnx
∗
n−k , (2.1)
Rxy[k] =
∑
n
xny
∗
n−k , (2.2)
respectively, where * denotes the complex conjugate. From an a-posterior proba-
bility perspective, classification and verification are related processes that can be
independently implemented [11]. However, existing classification processes require
considerable resources for a large number of classes and/or class features. Con-
siderable work has been dedicated to quantifying and reducing the computational
complexity of such processes [3,43]. Still, concern remains for implementation using
systems having limited or modest computing capability. Correlation-based methods
are a less computationally intensive alternative for addressing these concerns and the
foundation of optimal matched filtering applications, with one prevalent implemen-
tation being the estimation of digital communication symbols [72]. Classification
processes vary greatly in the execution cost, but the correlation process operational
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cost is predictable and well bounded. The operational performance using two discrete
sequences, say x[n] and y[n] of length N , is computable and analytically bounded
by
O(RXY [x[n], y[n]]) ∼ O(N2). (2.3)
where O(·) denotes the computational time complexity.
2.4.2 Hilbert Transform. The Hilbert Transform (HT) is commonly used
in audio signal processing applications to stabilize signal amplitude (envelope) esti-
mation [31,71]. The HT of continuous signal xs(t) is given by [30,32]
H(t) = xs(t)~
1
πt
=
1
π
P.V.
∫ ∞
−∞
x(τ)
t− τ
dτ , (2.4)
where ~ denotes convolution and P.V. denotes the Cauchy principal value. Now
letting x[n] be a periodic sequence of N consecutive time samples of xs(t), elements
of the Discrete Hilbert Transform (DHT) are given by [50]
H[n] =
2
N
∑
k Odd
xs(k)cot
( π
N
)
(n− k) ; n Even , (2.5)
H[n] =
2
N
∑
k Even
xs(k)cot
( π
N
)
(n− k) ; n Odd . (2.6)
Of importance to this research is that the near-field probe and o’scope collection
process described in Sect. 2.3.2 yields real-valued samples of the collected emis-
sion. Thus, the DHT process in (2.5) and (2.6) is readily implemented using the
MATLAB R⃝ hilbert function. Strictly speaking, the MATLABR⃝ hilbert func-
tion returns a complex analytic signal representation with the real In-phase (I)
components being the original input sequence and the imaginary Quadrature (Q)
components being the input sequence with a 90◦ phase shift [62]. The imaginary
28
Quadrature components represent the results of performing the Hilbert transform of
the original real sequence. The corresponding instantaneous amplitude response of
the real-valued input signal is simply found by taking the magnitude of each complex
I-Q pair and has the same length as the original sampled response.
2.5 Verification-Based Discrimination
The verification-based discrimination process used for this research is consistent
with the methodology used for biometric identity verification [48]. As implemented
here, the one-to-one verification process includes a comparison the DUT’s current
unknown state (as captured in a current RF fingerprint) with a stored reference
fingerprint from the same device operating in a known state. This process and fin-
gerprints from untransformed time domain URE signals had been previously used to
verify PIC micro-controller operation (software discrimination) and to discriminate
between PIC micro-controller ICs (hardware discrimination) [11]. The process in
these earlier works was adopted here to support an anomalous vs. normal assess-
ment methodology. In this case, an anomaly is any type of response, behavior, etc.,
that is not deemed normal and which may occur as a result of hardware and/or soft-
ware failure, degradation, or modification; the focus here was on detecting software
anomalies through verification of the operating condition response.
By implementing the general biometric verification process in support of hard-
ware anomaly detection, PIC micro-controller identities have been verified to better
than 99.5% accuracy [11]. These previous results increased the envisioned proba-
bility of success for the proposed anomalous vs. normal assessment methodology
described in Chapter 3 using more complicated PLC-based SCADA device operations
with a goal toward determining the DUTs current operational state. The verification
process is implemented by presenting all current observations as normal operation
regardless of the actual (unknown) operation and making a final declaration of nor-
mal or anomalous. Relative to possible verification outcomes in other verification
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and detection work [11,48,83], Table 2.1 shows there are four possible outcomes from
the normal vs. anomalous declaration process. In the context of successful Anomaly
Detection, the True Anomaly Detection outcome represents success.
Table 2.1: Normal vs. Anomalous Verification Outcomes: A device’s current oper-
ational state is assessed by claiming Normal and making a final declaration based
on operational credential analysis with a goal of achieving reliable True Anomaly
Detection.
Actual Claimed Declared Outcome
Normal Normal Normal True Normal Verification
Normal Normal Anomaly False Anomaly Detection
Anomaly Normal Normal False Normal Verification
Anomaly Normal Anomaly True Anomaly Detection
2.5.1 ROC Performance Assessment. Quantitative performance assess-
ment of the verification-based anomalous vs. normal assessment is based on ROC
curve analysis as commonly used for binary classification problems such as biometric
verification [11, 48]. In this case, verification threshold tV is set based on training
and used to declare (rightly or wrongly) that the current operating condition is nor-
mal (verification) or anomalous (detection). For assessment outcomes in Table 2.1,
ROC curves are generated by varying tV over its valid range and recording the True
Anomaly Detection Rate (TADR) (anomalous conditions correctly declared anoma-
lous) and the False Anomaly Detection Rate (FADR) (normal conditions incorrectly
declared anomalous) for each variation in tV . The resultant ROC curve is plotted as
TADR versus FADR as threshold tV varies. The Equal Error Rate (EER) point is
the point on the ROC curve at which FADR=1 − TADR=FNV R (False Normal
Verification Rate). The EER provides a single metric for comparing two detection
methods, with a lower EER indicating a more effective detection method.
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3. Methodology
This chapter provides details on the methodology implemented to conduct the re-
search and generate results presented in Chapter 4. The Correlation Based Anomaly
Detection (CBAD) process is used to detect anomalous Programmable Logic Con-
troller (PLC) operating conditions, with a goal of reliably differentiating between
desired normal (Norm) and undesired anomalous (Anom) operating conditions. In
an operational environment an anomalous operating condition could be triggered by
software and/or hardware failure, degradation, etc. Thus, a single verification-based
anomaly detection approach was developed here to support 1) software anomaly de-
tection–discriminating between various operating conditions to detect malfunctioning
or malicious software, firmware, etc., and 2) hardware component discrimination–
discriminating between various hardware components to detect malfunctioning or
counterfeit, trojan, etc., Integrated Circuits (ICs).
Software anomaly detection capability is assessed in Chapter 4 using the pro-
posed CBAD process with three specific collected, sampled, and post-collection
processed input sequence types: 1) Time Domain (TD) PLC emission sequences
2) Hilbert transformed PLC TD emission sequences, and 3) Radio Frequency Dis-
tinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) feature sequences. Hardware discrimination capa-
bility is likewise assessed in Chapter 4 using a Generalized Relevance Learning Vector
Quantization-Improved (GRLVQI) process with two specific collected, sampled, and
post-collection processed input sequence types: 1) RF-DNA feature sequences ex-
tracted from TD PLC sequences, and 2) CBAD Correlation Domain (CD) feature
sequences extracted from Hilbert transformed TD PLC sequences. Details for the
PLC devices, PLC Norm and Anom Ladder Logic Programs (LLPs), RF emission
collection and processing, and the CBAD and GRLVQI verification process are pro-
vided in the following sections.
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3.1 PLC Device Description
Chapter 4 results are based on experimentally collected RF emissions from
ND=10 Allen Bradley SLC-500 05/02 Central Processing Unit (CPU) PLC devices.
The Device Under Test (DUT) to PLC identity (ID) mapping is presented in Ta-
ble 3.1. The PLC devices are all the same make and model and were chosen for
proof-of-concept demonstration given they 1) are readily available commercially,
2) they are prominently used in industry, and 3) their primary Micro Controller
Unit (MCU) has similar clock speed and internal data bus structure to other MCU
used in previous related efforts [10, 11].
Table 3.1: Device Under Test (DUT) to PLC Identity ID Mapping and Class ID
Assignment Based on Device Labeling and Logos.
DUT ID MCU Label MCU Logo PLC ID Class ID
DUT1 NXP None WQ 1
DUT2 NXP None WV 1
DUT3 None Philips KG 2
DUT4 None Philips QI 2
DUT5 Philips Philips KV 3
DUT6 Philips Philips OV 3
DUT7 Philips Philips RG 3
DUT8 None Philips ZC 4
DUT9 None Philips ZZ 4
DUT10 Signetics & Intel Signetics ZA 5
The selected PLC devices are visually discernable and were categorized into
classes based on different labeling characteristics. An additional means for quali-
tatively categorizing devices is through visual analysis of RF emission spectral in-
tensity–a graphical representation of maximum Power Spectral Density (PSD). For
assessment here, spectral intensity plots were generated by collecting NB=400 emis-
sions from each device executing an arbitrary LLP using a Low Pass Filter (LPF) to
mitigate aliasing effects. The LPF had an effective bandwidth of WLP≈81.0 MHz.
Considering an arbitrary sampled TD sequence havingNs total samples, x[n]={x[ni],
x[n2], ..., x[nNs ]}, the corresponding PSD components |X[n]| can be obtained using
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a Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) given by [72],
X[n] =
1
Ns
Ns∑
k=1
x[n]e−jΦ(Ns,k,m) : 1 ≤ m ≤ Ns , (3.1)
where
Φ(Ns, k,m) =
(
2π
Ns
)
(k − 1)(m− 1) : 1 ≤ m ≤ Ns . (3.2)
The PLC spectral intensity plots (20×20 max[|X[n]|] values) were generated
using (3.1) and (3.2) for all ND=10 devices using NB=400 total emission collections,
with one emission collected from each of (NX=20)×(NY=20)=400 uniformly spaced
points on a rectangular grid over the DUT surface. The resultant spectral intensity
plots are shown in Fig. 3.1 and provide an alternate, qualitative means of assigning
DUTs to classes. Each point on the 2D plots represents the max[|X[n]|] of the PSD
series associated with the emission collected at that location. Note that Device RG
is assigned to Class 3 based on DUT markings in Table 3.1, but bears a closer
resemblance to devices in Class 1 when considering its spectral intensity in Fig. 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Spectral intensity plots generated as emission maximum PSD responses
over a 20×20 uniform grid above the PLC MCU surface. Plots enable qualitative
device classification base on visual analysis of emission characteristics. With one
exception, responses here confirm the PLC class assignments in Table 3.1 which
are based on device label markings; the RG PLC response here is visually more
consistent with Class 1 vs. the Class 3 table assignment.
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3.2 PLC Operating Conditions
PLC emissions were collected for a single Norm and two Anom operating con-
ditions using the experimental LLPs shown in Fig. 3.2. Prior to collecting PLC
responses using the methods described in Sect. 3.4, the PLC devices were pre-
programmed with the desired LLP which was then executed repeatedly until halted
through user intervention. Two major LLP variants were implemented for demon-
stration, including an 1) NOP=5 version and 2) NOP=10 version for each of the
Norm, Anom #1 and Anom #2 operating conditions (six total LLPs). The LLPs
were executed repeatedly and emissions collected from the PLC until power was
turned off or execution was terminated through user intervention.
3.2.1 Ladder Logic Program: NOP=5. The first LLP variant is used to
demonstrate the feasibility of CBAD processing using NOP=5 LLP operations and
consists of a specific order of Move (MOV ) and Square-Root (SQR) commands
that operate on data within the PLC memory. While not graphically illustrated, the
results after each executed operation are saved to registers within the PLCs before the
next operation is executed. As shown in Fig. 3.2, the anomalous operating condition
programs were generated from the Norm operating condition program by reordering
(Anom #1) and replacing (Anom #2) specific operations. These anomalous program
conditions are intended to mimic potentially disruptive and/or malicious alterations
as shown in . As seen in Fig. 2(a), the Norm LLP consists of alternating MOV and
SQR operations: {MOV, SQR,MOV, SQR,MOV }. These were chosen to contrast
a relatively short operation (MOV ) with a more computational demanding operation
(SQR) in an effort to simplify the first attempt at detecting software anomalies.
The Anom #1 operating condition LLP was created by reordering the N2=2
nd
and N3=3
rd operations. The resulting LLP consists of: {MOV, MOV, SQR, SQR,
MOV }. The Anom #2 operating condition LLP was created by replacing the
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N4=4
th operation (SQR) with a MOV operation. The resulting LLP consists of:
{MOV, SQR, MOV, MOV, MOV }.
3.2.2 Ladder Logic Program: NOP=10. The second LLP variant consists of
NOp=10 total PLC operations and includes a specific order of Move (MOV ), Square-
Root (SQR), Add (ADD), Multiply (MUL), Subtract (SUB), Divide (DIV ), Negate
(NEG), Convert To Binary Coded Decimal (TOD), and Convert From Binary
Coded Decimal (FRD) commands that operate on data within the PLC memory.
While not graphically illustrated, the results after each executed operation are saved
to registers within the PLCs before the next operation is executed. The operations
were selected to exercise the available math functions for the selected PLCs. As
shown in Fig. 3.2, the anomalous operating condition programs are generated from
the Norm operating condition program by reordering (Anom #1) and replacing
(Anom #2) specific operations. These anomalous program conditions are intended
to mimic potentially disruptive and/or malicious alterations as shown in Fig. 3.2.
The Anom #1 operating condition LLP was created by reordering the N5=5
th
and N6=6
th operations. The resulting LLP consists of: {MOV, SQR, ADD, MUL,
DIV, SUB, NEG, TOD, FRD, SQR}. The Anom#2 operating condition LLP was
created by replacing the N4=4
th operation (MUL) with an ADD operation. The
resulting LLP consists of: {MOV, SQR, ADD, ADD, SUB, DIV, NEG, TOD,
FRD, SQR}.
3.3 CBAD Processing Overview
The CBAD process was implemented as illustrated in Fig. 3.3 and used to
perform verification-based anomaly detection using five distinct sub-processes:
1. RF Emission Collection–emissions are collected from each PLC operating under
Norm and/or Anom conditions as required to support both software anomaly
detection and hardware component discrimination assessment.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.2: Normal (Norm) and Anomalous (Anom) ladder logic programs for
(a) NOP=5 and (b) NOP=10 operating conditions. Anomalous conditions are in-
duced through reordering (Anom #1) and replacement (Anom #2) of selected op-
erations.
2. Data Segregation–sequences are divided into independent “Training” (xTng[n])
and “Testing” (xTst[n]) sets; this distinction is adopted here for consistency
with terminology used in the pattern recognition community [22].
3. Normal Reference Sequence Generation–normal reference sequence xN [n] in
Fig. 3.3 is generated using Normal “Training” data in xTng[n].
4. Cross-Correlation CNC [k] Generation–CNC [k] is generated using the selected
xN [n] reference sequence and a given Collected sequence xC [n] to be verified.
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Figure 3.3: Correlation-Based Anomaly Detection (CBAD) process for verifying
that the Current unknown sequence XC [n] is a result of either a) Normal operating
conditions (declared when zV≤tV ) or b) Anomalous operating conditions (declared
zV>tV ). The claimed condition is always normal and implemented using a correla-
tion reference of XR=XN [89].
5. Verification Test Statistic Generation–verification test statistic zV is generated
using a selected Difference Function f∆ and correlation Difference C∆[k], i.e.,
zV=f∆(C∆[k]).
6. Establish Verification Threshold–verification threshold tV is determined and set
using CBAD “Training” statistics {zV [n]} under Norm operating conditions.
7. Verification Declaration–test statistic zVTst is compared with the established
verification threshold tV and a declaration made such that zVTst≤tV→Norm
and zVTst>tV→Anom.
More details for each of these CBAD processing steps are provided in Sect. 3.8.
3.4 RF Emission Processing
Experimentally collected PLC emissions were used to form required input se-
quences for CBAD and RF-DNA processes. RF emissions were collected using a
Riscure RF probe attached to a LeCroy 804Zi Oscilloscope. All DUT RF emissions
were collected at sample frequency of fs=250 MSps using a near-field probe having
a baseband bandwidth of WBB=500 MHz. Following the collection and sampling of
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the emissions, they are post-collection processed using MATLABR⃝ functions. The
processing includes filtering, downconverting, and decimating the emissions prior to
using the emissions as input sequences for the CBAD process. The following sections
provide details related to the processing and collection of the RF emissions.
3.4.1 Collection and Sampling. The frequency of interest for the RF collec-
tions against URE devices in previous research efforts had been selected based on the
harmonics of the clock frequency for the target devices [10,11]. The observed MCU
clock frequency in the Allen Bradley PLCs was fCLK=18.5 MHz, with the strongest
frequency component spectrally aligned with a clock harmonic. As seen in Fig. 3.4,
this component is manifest near the HCLK=3
rd MCU clock harmonic for the Allen
Bradley PLCs considered and has a targeted collection frequency of fc=55.5 MHz.
To ensure the targeted signal frequency is collected in compliance with Nyquist cri-
Figure 3.4: Representative normalized PSD for the PLC WQ device showing a
distinct peak response at f≈55.3 MHz.
teria, the signal is sampled at a rate of fs=250MSps. To minimize aliasing caused by
frequency components f≥125 MHz, the signal is filtered after collection by the RF
probe and prior to sampling using a passive inline LPF having a cutoff frequency of
fCO=81.0 MHz such that all frequency components greater than fCO are attenuated
by 3.0dB or greater. The attenuation for frequency values of interest is shown in
Fig. 3.5. The collected, filtered, sampled RF emission is stored as a sequence of
real values representing the measured voltage of the signal as sampled at each time
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region. The real values are stored as 8-bit integers. The signal collection and storage
process, from collecting using the RF probe, to storage as integer sequences is per-
formed in real-time. Following the collection and storage, the signals are processed
using MATLAB R⃝ prior to being used as inputs for the CBAD process.
Figure 3.5: Impulse frequency response of the fCO=81.0 MHz LPF. The filter is
designed to mitigate adverse aliasing effects by attenuating frequency components
above f≈125 MHz by at least 29.5dB.
3.4.2 PLC Mainboard Mounting. Prior to emission collection, the DUT
must be placed in a position such that the near-field probe can be placed in close
proximity to the MCU on the PLC Mainboard. The PLCs, as manufactured, do not
provide space for placement of the probe due to obstruction caused by the casing.
All mainboards were removed from their casing for the purpose of this research
effort. The entire PLC device plugs into a backplane, which provides power and
communication between PLC modules. In order to provide room to place the probe,
the PLC mainboards are connected to the backplane using a set of extension cables.
All PLCs are connected using the same set of cables, which must be unplugged from
one DUT and plugged into the next between DUT emission collections. The PLC
mainboards are placed on a probe table providing support for the mainboard and
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the ability to move the probe in three dimensions spatially. The probe table provides
precise placement of the probe, but does not have a native ability to repeat probe
placement positions between collections. A probe placement routine was used to
reliably place the probe prior to each collection. The probe placement routine is
discussed in Sect. 3.4.3. The collection configuration can be seen in Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6: Picture of XYZ near-field probe station used for collecting PLC emissions.
3.4.3 RF Near-Field Probe Placement. Course near-field probe placement
was determined once per DUT during initial testing and physically marked for re-
peated placement during subsequent collections. The alignment to a physical marker
is not precise enough to avoid altering the collected emissions between collection
sessions where the DUT must be removed from the probe table and replaced for col-
lection. Probe placement was performed through a two step process that included
1) Course Placement–the probe is placed a predetermined location on the device
surface, and 2) Refined Placement–the probe is repositioned based on RF emission
analysis.
The physical location is defined on each device such that the same position
is used for every device relative to each device’s physical attributes. To limit the
variation between collection locations on the devices, the probe is placed in a location
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such that two lines, parallel to the physical edges of the PLCMCU, but perpendicular
to each other, are tangential to the edge of the probe. Figure 3.7 shows the physical
location where the probe is placed.
Figure 3.7: The red perpendicular lines are tangent to the near-field probe (blue
dot) and identify the location used for PLC MCU emission collection.
The specific probe placement is determined by collecting emissions at NL=100
locations on a (DX=10)×(DY=10) dimensional grid over a (xm=0.75 cm)×(ym=0.75 cm)
square region on the MCU surface. At each location i, a single alignment location
sequence xai [n] is collected. The sequence is collected during the PLC execution or
scan of an alignment LLP. The alignment LLP uses the MOV and SQR PLC opera-
tions. The alignment LLP consists of an ordered sequence ofNOP=6 PLC operations:
{MOV, SQR, MOV, SQR, MOV, SQR}. The collected sequences are processed
using the same process and method as is implemented for the post-collection pro-
cessing detailed in Sect. 3.5. The details of the processing are not critical to the
understanding of the probe placement routine, but it is important to note that they
match those implemented during the training and testing of the CBAD Process.
Recall the alignment LLP consists of alternating MOV and SQR operations.
An alignment reference LLP is used in conjunction with the alignment LLP to select
the probe position prior to collecting emissions from the PLC MCU. The alignment
reference LLP consists of a single MOV and SQR operation. The sampled, discrete
alignment reference signal xR[n] is collected while the reference LLP is executed by
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the PLC and it represents a single scan of the alignment reference LLP. While there
are NL=100 alignment sequences, {xA1[n], xA2[n], ..., xA100 [n]], there is only a single
alignment reference signal xR[n].
Correlation was the foundation of this research and plays a critical role in
nearly every aspect of CBAD processing, including probe placement and alignment.
The correlation process is analytically described from a random process perspective
in Sect. 2.4.1. For the purpose of this research a tailored correlation process is
implemented. Considering two real-valued discrete input sequences, x[n] having Nx
samples and y[n] having Ny samples with Ny≤Nx, the jth element of cross-correlation
sequence Cxy[k] as implemented in this research is calculated as
Cxy[kj] =
Nx∑
i=1
x[ni] · y[nj+i] : 1 ≤ j ≤ Ny −Nx . (3.3)
An automated, repeatable approach for evaluating responses from the NL=100
probe locations on the DUT was needed to select a location that was best-suited for
emission collections. The evaluation criteria are derived from the aligned correlation
sequence CAi [k] resulting from the correlation process equation (3.3) using the i
th
alignment emission xai [n] and the alignment reference emission xR[n] as inputs. For
the ith alignment sequence xAi [n] having Na samples and reference emission xR[n]
having Nr samples, the j
th element of the ith alignment correlation sequence CAi for
the ith probe location is calculated as
CAi [kj] =
Nr∑
i=1
xR[ni] · xAi [nj+i] : 1 ≤ j ≤ Na −Nr . (3.4)
Correlation sequence peaks provide a measure of performance for each poten-
tial probe position. The alignment reference LLP sequence xR[n] consists of a single
{MOV, SQR} sequence as compared to the three {MOV, SQR} sequences in the
alignment LLP sequence xA[n]. For each emission collected, NP=3 peaks are ex-
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pected in the CA[k] sequence given that the alignment LLP consists of the reference
LLP repeated NP=3 times. The probe position on the (DX=10)×(DY=10) dimen-
sional grid was selected based on a voting process that considers three values for each
of the NL=100 alignment correlation sequences: 1) the maximum correlation value,
2) the mean value of the highest NP=3 correlation peaks, and, 3) the sum of the
highest NP=3 correlation peaks. A probe position producing the highest value for
two of the three criteria is used as the position for emission collection. For cases when
no single emission satisfies this criteria, the probe position yielding the maximum
mean correlation of the highest three peaks is used.
3.4.4 PLC LLP Triggering. A trigger was used to initialize RF emission
collections based on a Light Emitting Diode (LED) output voltage (VLED=5.0 V)
assigned as a physical PLC register output during the first MOV operation in each
LLP. This output was toggled during each scan by a square wave having an ap-
proximate 50% duty cycle and scan frequency of fScn=1/(2×TScn) where TScn is the
approximate time it takes to complete a single LLP scan. Both the leading and
trailing edge of the square wave were used as a trigger. Since the PLC outputs are
assigned at the end of a scan, the triggered collections actually began just prior to the
start of a subsequent scan with square wave period (TScn) providing an approximate
measure of collected scan duration.
3.5 Post-Collection Processing
Following the collection, sampling, and storage the emissions are post-collection
processed using MATLAB R⃝. Before the post-collection process can begin the se-
quences are converted from the native Riscure Inspector R⃝ software format to a
MATLAB R⃝ compatible format. This is accomplished using code developed in sup-
port of previous AFIT Unintentional Radiated Emission (URE) research efforts [9].
The code was implemented in its original, unaltered state and so is not discussed in
detail for this research effort.
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Once the collected emissions are converted to a MATLAB R⃝ compatible format,
post-collection processing can be performed using four primary steps: 1) down-
conversion to an Intermediate Frequency (IF), 2) digital bandpass filtering, 3) down-
sampling using proper decimation, and 4) applying the selected transform to obtain
the final sequence used for verification. Each of these processes are described in
greater detail in the following sections.
3.5.1 Down-Conversion and Bandpass Filtering. Following collection and
storage of the input sequences, the signals were processed using MATLAB R⃝ to isolate
specific frequency components of interest, down-convert the signals to near-baseband,
and properly decimate to signals to reduce computational overhead of subsequent
processing. The emissions were digitally filtered after collection using an 8th-order
Butterworth bandpass filter with a center frequency of fBP=55.5 MHz and −3.0dB
bandwidth of WBP=1.0 MHz. The frequency response of the filter is presented in
Fig. 3.8. The center frequency was empirically selected based on observing emissions
Figure 3.8: Impulse frequency response of the digital 8th-order Butterworth bandpass
filter having a center frequency of fBP≈55.5 MHz and a −3.0 dB bandwidth of
WBP≈1.0 MHz.
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from all PLC devices as the third MCU clock harmonic (fc=3×fCLK=55.5 MHz).
The center frequency and bandwidth were selected based on analysis of center fre-
quencies fc={18.5, 37.0, 55.5, 74.0} MHz as aligned to the first four clock harmonics
for the observed MCU clock frequency fCLK=15.5 MHz and −3.0 dB bandwidths
of BWBP={1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 5} MHz. The analysis demonstrated that the selected
bandwidth and center frequency provided the best performance in accurately dis-
criminating between the MOV and SQR PLC operations. Operation discrimination
performance was assessed using the CBAD process to generate test statistics with a
single training reference sequence and multiple test sequences from the ND=6 PLCs
that were initially purchased to support the research effort; these are the WQ, WV,
RG, KG, KV, QI devices identified in Table 3.1.
3.5.2 Sub-Sampling/Proper Decimation. Based on spectral analysis and
in accordance with Nyquist criteria, the down-converted bandpass TD responses
were properly decimated by a factor of 20 to produce sub-sampled sequences at
fs=12.5 MSps for post-collection processing. By down-converting the filtered signal
to fIF=2.0 MHz, the original signal content in f∈[55.0, 56.0] MHz is relocated to a
down-converted range of f∈[1.0, 3.0] MHz. With the frequency content of interest
centered at fIF=2.0 MHz, the signal was filtered using a LPF having a −3.0 dB
cutoff frequency of fLPF=3.5 MHz and the impulse response seen in Fig. 3.9. The
filtered signal is decimated by a factor of 20, reducing the number of signal samples
yielding a final sampling rate of fs=12.5 MSps for the down-converted signal.
3.5.3 Signal-to-Noise Ratio Scaling. The experimentally collected emis-
sions consisted of two components, including the 1) desired signal component xs[n],
and an 2) undesired background noise component xB[n]. It was assumed the sig-
nal and noise components are independent and that xs[n] is generally determinis-
tic and xB[n] is a random process; under these assumptions the collected response
xC [n]=xs[n]+xB[n] is a random process. One research objective involved assessing
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Figure 3.9: Impulse frequency response of the digital 8th-order Butterworth LPF
having a −3.0dB bandwidth of WLP≈3.5 MHz.
verification-based anomaly detection performance under varying SNR conditions
given that SNR variation commonly occurs in operational environments given in-
herent RF channel variation between the RF source and collection receiver. The
SNR is calculated as the ratio of average signal power (Ps) to average noise power
(PN) expressed in Decibels (dB).
To mitigate the need for repeated emission collections at varying distances and
channel conditions, the SNR variation effects were simulated by adding like-filtered,
power scaled Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) noise realizations xN [n] to as-
collected, filtered PLC emissions xC [n]. The resultant “as evaluated” sequence that is
used for performance assessment and analysis is given by xA[n]=xs[n]+xB[n]+xN [n]
where xN [n] has been appropriately power-scaled to achieve the desired analysis
SNRA. The average power in an arbitrary complex sequence y[n] having Ny can be
estimated using,
Py ≈
1
Ny
Ns∑
i=1
y[ni]y[ni]
∗ , (3.5)
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where * denotes complex conjugate. When y[n] is real-valued (3.5) becomes,
Py ≈
1
Ny
Ns∑
i=1
y[ni]
2 . (3.6)
Considering that real-valued PLC collections were used for this research, the ex-
pression in (3.6) was appropriate for calculating required average powers and AWGN
power scale factors. Given a desired SNRA with xA[n]=xs[n]+xB[n]+xN [n] repre-
senting the analysis sequence, the average power in xA[n] and its components can
be calculated using (3.5) and are denoted by PA, Ps, PB, and PN for the respective
xA[n], xs[n], xB[n], and xN [n] sequences. Assuming all components of xA[n] are in-
dependent, the total average power in xA[n] is PA=Ps+PB+PN and SNRA can be
calculated using
SNRA = Ps/(PB + PN) . (3.7)
Given that Ps and PB can be estimated for experimentally collected emissions,
the SNRA expression in (3.7) is used to solve for the required PN in xN [n] using
PN = (Ps/SNRA)− PB , (3.8)
which in turn is used to calculate the corresponding power scale factor for AWGN
noise realizations, i.e., xN [n]≈
√
PN xAWGN [n] for xAWGN [n] : N [0, 1].
Each collection of “as evaluated” xA[n] analysis sequences at SNRA that are
input to the CBAD process was generated using a total of NNz independent, like-
filtered AWGN realizations for xN [n]. Thus, for a performance assessment based on
NB collected emission sequences {xC1[n], xC2[n], ..., xCNB [n]} there are a total of
NZ=NB×NNz sequences used for each SNRA considered.
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3.6 Sequence Transformation
Prior to inputting sequences into the CBAD process, the sequences are trans-
formed using one of three methods implemented under this research: 1) an absolute
value function, 2) a Hilbert transform function, and 3) an RF-DNA transform. In ad-
dition, the resultant absolute value and Hilbert transform sequences are normalized
to produce x[n] which is input to the CBAD process. For sequence x[n], normaliza-
tion of the ith element is given by
x[ni] =
x[ni]
max(x[n])
. (3.9)
The absolute value function is the simplest and transforms a given emission sequence,
x[n], by computing the magnitude of each sequence element. This process is well-
known and does not warrant additional discussion. The Hilbert transform and RF-
DNA Transform methods are more complicated and discussed further in the following
sections.
3.6.1 Hilbert Transform. The CBAD verification process is agnostic to
what the sequence elements represent and the above process is applicable for all real-
valued sequences x[n]. Thus, the sequences can be generated as either the magnitude
of untransformed real valued TD sequences (|x[n]|) or as the magnitude of Hilbert
transformed TD responses (|H[x[n]]|). The transition to |H[x[n]]| sequences was
motivated by previous research showing that anomaly detection capability using
|x[n]| sequences is negatively impacted by cross-collection variance in RF emissions.
The observed misalignment (cross-collection time registration) of data sets was often
less than ±10 TD samples, yet resultant variation degraded verification performance
considerably. Thus, as in audio signal processing applications the Hilbert transform
is used to stabilize signal’s amplitude estimates, [32,71].
Recall the frequency components of interest are constrained in a frequency
range centered around fc=55.5 MHz with a bandwidth of WBW=1MHz. Similar to
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the work in [101], the Hilbert transform provides a means of estimating an ampli-
tude envelope for a narrowly determined frequency range. The amplitude estimate
sequence is obtained from the Hilbert transformed sequence by calculating the mag-
nitude of the complex pair representing each element of the Hilbert transformed
sequence. The Hilbert transform in (2.4) effectively shifts the phase of a continuous
signal by ϕ=π/2 radians for all frequency components. The MATLAB R⃝ hilbert
function is used to generate the transformed discrete sequence H[x[n]] for a given
real-valued sequence x[n]. The hilbert function in MATLAB R⃝ returns a complex
time analytic representation of the signal having In-phase (I) and Quadrature (Q)
components. The magnitude response of a discrete Hilbert sequence |H[x[n]]| rep-
resents the instantaneous amplitude or envelope of the discrete sequence x[n]. The
input sequence to the CBAD process is the magnitude of the Hilbert Transformed
sequence |H[xs[n]]|, which is the same length as the TD sequence x[n]. Consider a
Hilbert transformed sequence generated using the hilbert function, H[xs[n]. Any
element H[xs[ni]] of the sequence consist of both real, Hre[xs[n]] and imaginary,
Him[xs[n]] components representing the In-Phase and Quadrature components of
the real signal. The amplitude estimate sequence |H[x[n]]| is defined for any ele-
ment |H[x[ni]]| by calculating the 2-norm with each real-imaginary pair considered
a vector
|H[x[ni]]| = || < Hre[xs[ni]], Him[xs[ni]] > ||2
=
√
(Hre[xs[ni]])2 + (Him[xs[ni]])2
(3.10)
A representative magnitude TD |x[n]| sequence is shown in Fig. 3.10 along
with its corresponding magnitude |H[x[n]]| sequence.
3.6.2 RF-DNA Transform. The RF-DNA transform was implemented
according to the process in [9, 21, 39, 58, 76, 102] and was used in this research to
reduce the dimensionality of the input sequences and identify those signal attributes
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Figure 3.10: Representative responses for the first two LLP operations (SQR and
MOV ) under Norm operating conditions: (Top) Magnitude of TD |x[n]| sequence
and (Bottom) corresponding Magnitude of Hilbert transform |H[x[n]| sequence.
that aid in the discrimination of hardware devices. The RF-DNA transform is a
mechanical process calculating sequence attributes without reliance or dependance
on the source of the sequence. It has been used previously on sequences representing
TD, Spectral Domain (SD), and Time-Frequency (T-F) sequences [11, 42, 81]. For
the purpose of this research effort, the RF-DNA was performed on TD emissions
only.
RF-DNA reduces the dimensionality of the TD sequences by calculating sta-
tistical values (standard deviation σ, variance σ2, skewness γ, and kurtosis κ) for
instantaneous sequence attributes (amplitude a, phase ϕ, frequency f) over NR spec-
ified signal regions for an arbitrary input sequence x[n]. Features are calculated for
each specified region of the sequence and concatenated together to form an RF-DNA
fingerprint fTD representing the entire sequence x[n].
Each collected DUT emission collected for this research was stored as a real-
valued TD sequence x[n]. Given that the RF-DNA process is inherently base on
complex IQ input sequences, the collected x[n] here were converted to complex IQ se-
quences of the form xIQ[n]=xre[n]+xim[n] using the hilbert function in MATLAB
R⃝.
Composite RF-DNA fingerprints were generated from selected sequences using the
following steps:
1. A given sequence xIQ[n] is divided into NR equal length contiguous subregions.
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2. Within a given subregion, the mean µ value is calculated and subtracted from
all subregion samples to minimize the impact of collection bias.
3. The desired instantaneous feature sequence(s) (phase ϕ[n], amplitude a[n],
and/or frequency f [n]) is calculated for the subregion samples.
4. Selected statistical attributes of standard deviation σ, variance σ2, skewness
γ, and/or kurtosis κ are calculated using all samples within the subregion.
5. The resultant statistical attributes are concatenated to form a single Regional
Fingerprint sequence with elements arranged in order of signal feature and
statistical attribute.
6. Steps 2-4 are repeated for each subregion of x[n] and the NR Regional Finger-
print sequences are concatenated to form the Composite Fingerprint sequence
for x[n].
The following sections provide more detail for each of the processes used to generate
a Composite Fingerprint sequence for a TD xIQ[n] sequence.
3.6.2.1 Instantaneous Feature Calculation. The first step in generat-
ing an RF-DNA fingerprint from a TD signal is calculation of selected instantaneous
signal features for the sampled TD signal. For the element xIQ[ni]=xre[ni] +xim[ni],
the instantaneous a[ni], phase ϕ[ni], and frequency f [ni] sequence elements were
calculated using [103]
a[ni] =
√
x2re[ni] + x
2
im[ni] , (3.11)
ϕ[ni] = tan
−1
[
xim[ni]
xre[ni]
]
, xre[ni] ̸= 0 , (3.12)
f [ni] =
1
2π
[
dϕ[ni]
dni
]
, (3.13)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ Nx and Nx is the total number of elements in xIQ[n].
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For consistency with previous research, the TD sequences in (3.11)–(3.13) are
centered and normalized using (3.9); centering simply removes the sequence mean
(µ) prior to normalization. The ith element of the centered and normalized sequences
ac[ni], ϕc[ni], and f c[ni] are calculated using [76]
ac[ni] =
a[ni]− µa
max
1≤j≤Nx
(ac[nj])
, (3.14)
ϕc[ni] =
ϕ[ni]− µϕ
max
1≤j≤Nx
(ϕc[nj])
, (3.15)
f c[ni] =
f [ni]− µf
max
1≤j≤Nx
(fc[nj])
, (3.16)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ Nx and Nx is the total number of elements in xIQ[n].
The resultant ac[ni], ϕc[ni], and f c[ni] sequences are divided into NR specified
regions prior to calculating the desired statistics of standard deviation σ, variance
σ2, skewness γ, and/or kurtosis κ for the signal attribute sequences. Additionally,
the statistics can be calculated over the entire signal response (union of all subre-
gion samples). The final Composite Fingerprint sequence for xIQ[n] is formed by
concatenating all subregions statistics, and the entire region statistics if generated.
This is illustrated in Fig. 3.11 which shows an abstract representation of RF-DNA
fingerprint generation using an arbitrary feature sequence [103].
3.7 Region of Interest Selection
When processed according to Sect. 3.5, the resultant sequences represent the
emission data across an entire LLP scan. Previous efforts that targeted URE re-
sponses were based on experiments where the researcher had precise control of the
devices being analyzed [10, 11]. As previously discussed, the PLC scan includes
not only the logic operations explicitly defined by the LLP, but also includes the
52
1 2 3 4 5 NR - 1 NR
NR + 1
fR3
σ – Std Deviation
σ2 – Variance
γ – Skewness
κ – Kurtosis
fR3 = [ σR3, σ
2
R3, γR3, κR3 ]
Arbitrary Feature Sequence
Figure 3.11: Abstract representation of RF-DNA fingerprint formation for an arbi-
trary sequence divided into NR subregions [103]. Standard deviation (σ), variance
(σ2), skewness (γ), and/or kurtosis (κ) are commonly used as RF-DNA features.
process of evaluating the physical device input values and assigning physical device
output values. Additionally, the PLC device also must perform low-level Operating
System (OS) functions such as system memory management and interrupt polling.
Significant portions of the RF emission signal are not directly attributable to the
LLP operations as seen in Fig. 3.12. The signal attributable to the specified LLP
operations must be extracted from the entire scan signal to produce a Region Of
Interest (ROI). A representative signal collected from an entire scan with the ROI
highlighted is pictured in Fig. 3.12. Once the ROI has been identified in a single
scan signal, it must be successfully and automatically extracted from the scan signal
content. Previous research efforts have involved IRE with clear, definable commu-
nication bursts that are clearly separable from the channel noise [34, 39, 76, 97, 102].
Considerable research has been dedicated to detecting and extracting bursts from
communication signals [35,56,58]. The signals considered for this research effort are
URE signals collected from operational PLC equipment, which have a more contin-
uous broadcast model as opposed to the burst broadcast model of communication
IRE devices. Additionally, the structure in the TD and SD for URE emissions is not
specified or engineered to be collected and processed and are significantly different in
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Figure 3.12: Representative TD collected sequences from a PLC device operating un-
der Norm and Anom conditions as indicated. The highlighted ROI regions represent
the response of one full LLP scan.
both domains for different semiconductor devices. These attributes of URE signals
provide a unique challenge when extracting the ROI for use in hardware or software
anomaly detection.
A correlation-based approach is used in this research in extracting the ROI.
Each implemented LLP begins with an alignment reference comprised of the {MOV,
SQR} LLP operation sequence previously used for probe placement. The {MOV,
SQR} sequence is used to detect the beginning of the ROI, containing operation
attributable signal content. Each LLP used in this research concludes with either a
MOV or SQR operation, designating the termination of the operation attributable
signal content. It is important to make a distinction to the use of LLP operations
to detect ROIs and PLC outputs to trigger the collection. Because outputs values
are assigned after the logical operations are performed, the physical trigger used
to initiate the collection of emissions is not aligned to the operation attributable
signal content. Additionally, unpredictable operations performed by the PLC MCU
preclude the use of a static alignment method.
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The following steps are performed on each collected, stored, and post-collection
processed signal xC [n]. The signal resulting from collections against the {MOV,
SQR} LLP, xAS[n] is referred to as the alignment start reference. The alignment
reference signal consists only of signal content attributable to the {MOV, SQR}
operations, extracted from a representative collected signal prior to the alignment
process. The signal resulting from collections against either a {SQR, MOV } LLP
(for NOP=5) or {SQR} LLP (for NOP=10), xAE[n] is referred to as the alignment
end reference. The alignment reference and conclusion reference are collected from
the same DUT as the sequences that are the source of the ROIs. The correlation
process is identical to the correlation process (3.3) used in the probe alignment pro-
cess discussed in Sect. 3.4.3. The goal, in this case, is to provide a means of not only
extracting the ROI from the burst, but also to ensure the operation attributable con-
tent of the ROIs are not corrupted by non-operation attributable signal content. In
addition to the non-attributable signal content exhibited in Fig. 3.12, the PLC DUT
also performs OS and system maintenance functions that may occur between the
execution of the LLP operations. pristine ROIs are those containing only operation
attributable signal content while corrupted ROI contain non-attributable content.
The ROIs are extracted and declared pristine or corrupted for a single collected
sequence xC [n] and alignment reference sequences xAS[n] and xAE[n] according to
the following:
1. Consider collected sequence xC [n]={xC [ni]}, i=1, 1, ..., NC and two alignment
reference sequences denoted by xAS[n]={xAS[ni]}, i=1, 2, ..., NAS, and
xAR[n]= {xAR[ni]}, i=1, 2, ..., NAR, with all based on collections from the the
same DUT.
2. The xC [n], xAS[n],and xAE[n] sequences are all collected and post-collection
processed using identical methods, i.e., filtering, down-sampling, and sequence
transformation.
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3. Two alignment signals are used:
1) xA1[n]={xAS[n1], xAS[n2], ..., xAS[nNASSamp ]} and
2) xA2[n]={xAE[nAESamp], xAE[n2−1], ..., xAE[n1]}.
4. The sequence xC [n] is divided into two sequences:
1) xC1[n]={xC [n1], xC [n2], ..., xC [nNCSamp ]} and
2) xC2[n]={xC [nCSamp], xC [n(2−1)], ..., xC [n1]}.
5. Cross correlation sequence CC1,A1[k] is calculated using (3.3) with the xC1[n]
and xA1[n] sequences as inputs. The value max(CC1,A1[k])=CC1,A1[kiMax1 ] and
index for the maximum value iMax1 are found and stored. The value iStart=iMax1
represents the estimated sample number for the ROI start.
6. Cross correlation sequence CC2,A2[k] is calculated using (3.3) with the xC2[n]
and xA2[n] sequences as inputs. The value max(CC2,A2[k])=CC2,A2[kiMax2 ] and
index for the maximum value iMax2 are found and stored. The value iMax2
represents the estimated number of samples from the end of signal xC [n] to the
end of the ROI. The estimated end of the ROI is iend=NCSamp− iMax2 samples
from the beginning of the signal xC [n].
7. For each signal xC [n] three criteria are used to select the ROIs:
1) Maximum correlation value for ROI start CMS=max(CC1,A1[k])
2) Maximum correlation value for ROI end CME=max(CC2,A2[k])
3) Estimated length in samples of the ROI NROIEst=iend − iStart.
The preceding steps are repeated for all NB potential sequences
PXC [n]={xC1 [n], xC2 [n], ..., xC1 [n]} to generate sets of criteria values associated with
the signals. Potential sequences are those that are still considered as candidates for
contributing a non-corrupted ROI. Let CMS[n]={CMS[n1], CMS[n2], ..., CMS[nNB ]}
be the set of maximum correlation values for the ROI start such that CMS[nk] is
the maximum correlation start value for the collected sequence xCk [n], Similarly,
let CME[n]={CME[n1], CME[n2], ..., CME[nNB ]}, be the set of maximum correlation
values for the ROI end generated from the NB collected sequences and
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NROIEst[n]={NROIEst[n1], NROIEst[n2], ..., NROIEst[nNB ]} be the set of estimated
ROI sample length for the collected sequences. Once the criteria have been calculated
for all signals considered, the following steps are used to assign a rank to the signals
so they can be sorted in order of priority: from those most pristine to those most
corrupted. The criteria are used to remove sequences from the list PXC [n] based on
evaluation of the criteria for the sequences.
The first step in extracting sequences that are not corrupted by non-attributable
content involves removing sequences based on estimated ROI length NROIEst[n].
Initially, all collected sequences are considered equal and kept in a set of poten-
tial sequences PXC [n]={xC1 [n], xC2 [n], ..., xCNB [n]}. For each collected sequence
xCk [n],1 ≤ k ≤ NB the estimated ROI length is compared to an established thresh-
old. It is assumed that the ROIs from sequences corrupted by the non-operation
attributable content will be longer, in samples, than those that do not contain the
extra content and sequences with an estimated ROI length exceeding the established
threshold are removed from the potential sequence list PXC [n]. The threshold is es-
tablished based on the mean and standard deviation values for the estimated ROI
length. Consider the mean µROIEst and standard deviation σROIEst values for the
estimated ROI sample length set NROIEst[n]. A sequence xCk [n] is removed from the
set of potential sequences PXC [n] if the estimated ROI length exceeds the threshold
NROIEst[nk]>µROIEst + 0.3σROIEst. This threshold was empirically chosen to offer
an acceptable balance of removing sequences with potentially corrupted ROIs and
keeping an adequate number of sequences for evaluation of the CBAD process.
Following removal of sequences that exceed the threshold
NROIEst[n]>µROIEst + 0.3σROIEst, the remaining sequences in the list are assigned a
rank rx[n] based on the maximum start and end correlation values CMS and CME.
A sequence, xCk [n] in the list PXC is assigned rank rx[nk]=µMS,ME[nk]. The value
µMS,ME[nk] is the mean of the 2-element set {CMS[nk], CME[nk]}, the maximum cor-
relation values for the estimated start and end of the ROI for sequence xCk [n]. The
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remaining sequences in the potential sequence set PXC [n] are restructured in descend-
ing order such that PXC [n1] is the sequence with the maximum value for µ(MS,ME)[n].
Sequences considered for evaluation are taken from the sorted set PXC [n]. For a de-
sired number of selected sequences NSel, the set of ordered sequences
PSel[n]={PXC [n1], PXC [n2], ..., PXC [nNSel ], } is used for evaluation of the process.
Once the final list of NSel selected sequences
PSel[n]={PSel[n1], PSel[n2], ..., PSel[nNSel ]} has been established, the ROIs must be
extracted. The ROIs are extracted based on the sample index iStart where the max-
imum start correlation value was found. The ROI length NROI is established based
on empirically observed ROI length for a representative sequence. For a sequence
xC [n]=PSel[nk]={xC [n1], xC [n2], ..., xC [nNs ]} with a maximum start correlation in-
dex iMax the ROI xROI [n]={xC [niMax ], xC [niMax+1], ..., xC [niMax+NROI−1]}.
3.8 CBAD Processing
The CBAD overview was presented in Sect. 3.3 and more details are pro-
vided here on key processing steps. The first step involved collecting RF emission
sequences from each DUT operating under Norm, Anom #1, and Anom #2 op-
erating conditions. For CBAD evaluation under this research, the collections were
performed for ND=10 PLC devices executing both the NOP=5 (Sect. 3.2.1) and
NOP=10 (Sect. 3.2.1) LLPs; the actual number of LLP operations is not significant
for the remaining discussion in this section. The sequences are collected and stored
as outlined in Sect. 3.4 and post-collection processed as outlined in Sect. 3.5.
The CBAD process is presented once, but is repeated for each device and at
each desired SNR independently. The Normal reference sequence is only generated
once and is not scaled for different SNR values.
3.8.1 Testing and Training Set Generation. The ROIs are extracted from
the collected and processed bursts as outlined in Sect. 3.7. The number of ROIs
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selected varied from NB=1 collected ROI selected for an initial proof of concept to
NB=1000 ROIs selected for the final results. The number of collected sequence ROIs
is not significant to the discussion of the process. The ROIs are separated into two
independent “Training” (xTng[n]) and “Testing” (xTst[n]) data sets; the “Training”
and “Testing” distinction adopted here for consistency with terminology used in the
pattern recognition community [22]. The training sequences were selected based
on an interleaved pattern. Assume a total of NB=1000 ROIs are in the set xC [n]
and %Tng=5% are selected as training sequences; a total of NTng=50 are used as
training sequences. In any situation where the value for %Tng and NB do not result
in an integer number, the number is rounded down to the nearest integer. Using an
interleaved selection pattern, the training set xTng[n] is constructed from sequences
in xC [n] by taking every other sequence (e.g., the odd numbered ones) out of xC [n].
The remaining NTst=NB-NTng sequences in xC [n] (e.g., the even numbered ones) are
placed in the testing set xTst[n].
While the CBAD process is trained only on the Normal sequences, the train-
ing and testing selection process is performed on the Normal and Anomalous sets
such that all testing sets have the same number of sequences. For clarity, let the
normal test set be xTstN [n], the anomalous condition#1 test set be xTstA1[n] and the
anomalous condition#2 test set be xTstA2[n]. The normal condition training set is
xTng[n] since there are no training sets for the anomalous condition.
For each desired SNR, the NTst Norm, Anom #1 and Anom #2 testing se-
quences are each added to NNr AWGN realizations for a total of
NTestRlz=NTst × NNr sequences used as testing sequences. For the purpose of this
CBAD process discussion, the focus is on a single SNR, device, operating condition
permutation. The steps in the CBAD process are implemented identically irrespec-
tive of what input sequences are used.
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3.8.2 Reference Sequence xR[n] Generation. The next step is to generate
the Normal Reference sequence xR[n] in Fig. 3.3 using the NTng normal sequences
contained in the “Training” data set xTng[n]. Recall, the training set is composed
entirely of sequences for the normal condition LLP Norm. As functionally denoted
in (3.17), the CBAD process accepts two inputs, a Reference sequence XR[n] and
an unknown Collected sequence xC [n], and outputs a single real-valued output test
statistic (zV ) or
zV = CBAD (xN [n], xC [n]) . (3.17)
The CBAD function is first used with input “Training” sequences xTng[n] to
generate the desired Normal operating sequence xN [n]. After setting the reference
xR[n]=xN [n] as illustrated in Fig. 3.3, the CBAD function is then used to generate
the collection of “Testing” verification test statistics zV . The reference sequence
xR[n]=xN [n] sequence is generated as follows:
1. Construct a set of NPot=NTng + 1 potential reference sequences xPot[n] con-
sisting of the NTng “Training” sequences xTng[n] and the sequence X̄Pot[n] cal-
culated as an average of NTng sequences. The final normal reference sequence
xN [n] is selected from the set of potential sequences xPot[n].
z̄Vi =
NPot−1∑
j=1
CBAD
(
xN [n] = xPoti [n], xC [n] = xPotj [n]
)
NPot − 1
: i = 1, 2, ..., NPot; j = 1, 2, ..., NPot; i ̸= j .
(3.18)
2. Consider the set of average statistic values resulting from the process in Step 2
zV [n]. The selected reference sequence is the potential reference sequence that,
when used as a reference sequence, yields the minimum average verification
statistic
xN [n] = xPoti [n] ∋ z̄V [ni] = min (z̄V [n1], z̄V [n2], ..., z̄V [nNPot ]) . (3.19)
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Once the Norm reference is selected, it is used as the reference sequence for
the remainder of CBAD processing.
3.8.3 Test Statistic zV Generation. The cross-correlation sequence CNC [k]
is generated for each test sequence using the selected xR[n] reference sequence and
test Sequence xTst[n] to be verified. This part of the process is completed for every
sequence in the test sequence set, but is presented for a single sequence to clearly out-
line the process. The resultant CNC [k] is then subtracted from the auto-correlation
sequence CNN [k] to generate the correlation difference sequence as C∆[k]=CNN [k]-
CNC [k].
For a reference sequence xR[n] and test sequence xTst[n] of equal size Ns, the
correlation difference sequence C∆[k] consists ofNCorrSamp=2Ns−1 samples. In order
to support the binary decision of declaring the sequence anomalous or normal the
correlation difference sequence C∆[k] is used to generate a single statistic value zV .
The verification test statistic zV is calculated using a pre-selected difference function
(f∆) and C∆[k] as zV=f∆(C∆[k]). For all results presented here, the difference
function is implemented as f∆=|C∆[k]|, i.e., a simple 2-norm magnitude operation.
Once the CBAD statistics have been generated, the input sequences xTst[n],
xTng[n], and xR[n] are no longer used.
3.8.4 Verification Threshold Determination. The next step in the CBAD
process is to establish the desired verification threshold tV . There are three CBAD
statistic sets resulting from the previous step in the CBAD process: 1) the statistic
set for the Norm operating condition zV N [n], 2) the statistic set for the Anom #1
operating condition zV A1[n], and 3) the statistic set for the Anom #2 operating
condition zV A2[n]. Recall, each set is the same size and contains NTst statistics.
The interleaved selection of testing and training sequence sets was repeated for
the statistic set zV N [n]. The threshold value tV was established using the collection
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of training verification test statistics zV Tng[n] and corresponding Probability Mass
Function (PMF) PZV (zV Tng). For a desired FADRD performance the threshold tV
was set such that the following is satisfied,
P [ZPTng > tV ] = FADRD , (3.20)
where ZPTng is the random variable with a distribution defined by the observed PMF
PZV (zV Tng) for the set of test statistics zV Tng[n].
3.8.5 Anomalous vs. Normal Declaration. Declaring input sequence xTst[n]
as being Norm or Anom was based on test statistics zV Tst derived from xTst[n]. The
final declaration is made using a simple comparison of input test statistic zV Tst with
the established Verification Threshold tV according to
zV Tst < tV → xTst[n] : Normal
zV Tst > tV → xTst[n] : Amomalous .
(3.21)
3.9 LLP Operation-by-Operation Processing
The CBAD process in Sect. 3.8 operates on entire input sequences and cal-
culates a single CBAD statistic for the entire waveform. An alternate method for
calculating CBAD statistics is to use multiple reference sequences consisting of stored
sequences for each LLP operation in the Norm operating condition. The anomalous
LLPs used to generate the collected emissions differ in either NOP=1 (Anom #2)
or NOP=2 operations (Anom #1) from the Norm operating condition LLP Norm.
The length, in samples, for the altered LLP operation dictates the number of sam-
ples that are different in the anomalous emissions. This step in the research effort
focused on leveraging knowledge of the normal operating sequence using NOP=10
unique reference signals to evaluate each LLP operating region for anomalous (dif-
ferent form the normal) behavior. Figure 3.13 shows the |H[x[n]]| emission sequence
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with the NOP=10 operations clearly depicted. The change in emissions due to a
Figure 3.13: Emission sequences with NOP=10 LLP operations being clearly at-
tributable to specific subregions. Operations highlighted in red represent changes
that were made to the Norm LLP to simulate anomalous operating conditions in
the Anom #1 and Anom #2 LLPs.
single altered operation may not be enough to surpass the detection threshold tV .
Therefore, an Operation-by-Operation CBAD process is employed where each oper-
ation is weighted equally when making the decision to declare anomalous or normal
regardless of the actual ratio of total samples the operation-attributable signal oc-
cupies.
The operation-by-operation implementation of the CBAD detection process
computes multiple CBAD statistics arranged in a sequence or CBAD statistics vector
< zV1 , zV2 , ..., zVNOP > where NOP is the number of LLP operations in the normal
operating condition program. The CBAD statistics are calculated for each of the
Norm LLP operation regions seen Fig. 3.13. Each delineated operation region has
a reference emission used to calculate the CBAD statistic for that operation region.
The NOP Norm operations clearly align with the operation-by-operation regions
while the Anom #1 and Anom #2 operations do not.
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Figure 3.14 illustrates the flow of the Operation-by-Operation CBAD process
showing parallel CBAD statistic calculations used to generate the NOP CBAD statis-
tics vector. The function fZ(·) used to reduce the CBAD statistics vector < zV1 , zV2 ,
..., zVNOP > is the 2-norm magnitude function | < zV1 , zV2 , ..., zVNOP > |. The end
result is still a single CBAD statistic used to declare the operating condition normal
or anomalous based on a threshold tV .
Figure 3.14: Parallel CBAD processing used to perform LLP operation-by-operation
correlation. The branch test statistics (zi) are used to form a composite CBAD test
statistic vector for final verification assessment, with a 2-norm magnitude used to
make the final Norm or Anom declaration.
3.10 Performance Evaluation
Verification performance was evaluated for this research using 1) True Anomaly
Detection Rate (TADR) vs. SNR performance curves, and 2) traditional Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves generated by plotting False Anomaly Detec-
tion Rate (FADR) vs. TADR based on discrete PMFs formed using selected test
statistics.
3.10.1 Performance Curves. The TADR vs. SNR performance curve is
generated by plotting the TADR for each SNR considered. Before the TADR values
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can be calculated, a threshold tV must be established to determine what statistic
values result in an anomalous declaration and what statistic values result in a normal
declaration. Each SNR value considered has a unique threshold value tV calculated
for use with sequences at that SNR. The threshold tV is calculated at each SNR value
considered to provide FADR=10.0%. The arbitrary Benchmark TADRB=90.0% is
used to determine the SNR value used for ROC curve generation.
3.10.2 CBAD Statistical PMFs. The experimental PMF derived from the
calculated CBAD statistics is used to generate the ROC curves. The PMFs are
experimentally determined and are generated in keeping with accepted random pro-
cess and signals methods [51]. It is also used to provide a qualitative measure of
separation between CBAD statistic values associated with the different operating
conditions or hardware devices. The PMFs are experimentally generated and de-
pend on a selection of a specific SNR value. The selected SNR value is the lowest
valued SNR that satisfies the benchmark TADRB=90.0% as specified in the previous
section.
3.10.3 ROC Curve Assessment. The ROC curves are generated in keeping
with accepted biometric standards and methods [48]. The ROC curve is generated
using the results of the experimental PMF calculations. A ROC curve consists of
data plotted for FADR vs. TADR and provides a means of comparing detectors
based on the Equal Error Rate (EER). The EER is the point at which the two errors
associated with verification (FADR and False Normal Verification Rate (FNVR) are
equal in keeping with accepted biometric verification standards and practices. [48].
The arbitrary benchmark for the EER is EERB=10.0%. This goal is determined by
the relationship of the FNVR and the performance benchmark of TADRB=90.0%:
FNV R=1− TADR.
ROC curves are generated by varying the threshold tV and calculating the
FADR and TADR values for each variation in threshold. Consider a set of normal
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CBAD statistics zN [n] with NZN elements and a set of anomalous CBAD statistics
zA[n] with NZA elements. Let tV [n] be the set of NV threshold values arranged in
ascending order such that tV [ni]<tV [nj], 1≤i<j≤NV , i̸=j. Considering the union of
Norm zN [n] and Anom zA[n] CBAD statistics,
zU = {zN [n1], zN [n2], ..., zN [nNZN ], zA[n1], zA[n2], ..., zA[nNZN ]} , (3.22)
Let tVR[n] be the set of threshold values used to generate the ROC curve. The
number of threshold values in the set tV [n] is dictated by the desired ROC resolution.
For this research, a total of NV=100 threshold values were sufficient for ROC curve
analysis. The set of NV=100 threshold values tV [n] used to generate the ROC curve
is based on the values in zU where tV [n1] is set equal to the minimum value of zU ,
tV [n1] = min{zU} , (3.23)
and the remaining elements are defined by
tV [ni] = tV [n(i−1)] +
(max{zU} −min{zU})
NV − 1
: i = 2, 3, ..., NV .
(3.24)
3.11 GRLVQI Processing
A majority of the initial research activity focused on software anomaly detec-
tion–discriminating between various operating conditions to detect malfunctioning
or malicious software, firmware, etc. However, an important parallel avenue of re-
search developed to support hardware device discrimination–discriminating between
various hardware components to detect malfunctioning or counterfeit, trojan, etc.,
Integrated Circuits (IC).
It was determined that the proposed verification-based anomaly detection pro-
cess was well-suited for the hardware device discrimination task and initial proof-of-
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concept demonstration was conducted using the GRLVQI process developed in [76];
the process was not modified under this effort so the minimal details are presented
here. The GRLVQI process is inherently signal agnostic and can accept any type of
sequence as input. For demonstrations here, two specific types of input sequences
were considered: 1) TD feature sequences and 2) Correlation Domain (CD) feature
sequences. The TD feature sequences fTD[n] were generated using the RF-DNA
process in Sect. 3.6.2 with NR=12 subregions plus the total response, all three in-
stantaneous features, and all four statistics, for a total of NF=156 features in each
Composite Fingerprint sequence.
To demonstrate hardware device discrimination, a single LLP was used to gen-
erate sequences for multiple PLC devices with goal of maintaining constant operating
conditions to ensure discrimination was based on device hardware. TheNOP=10 LLP
for Normal operating conditions was used to generate the RF-DNA fTD[n] feature
sequence for use in the hardware discrimination portion of the research.
In addition to TD feature sequences, the GRLVQI method of verification
was evaluated using CD feature sequences fCD[n] that were generated using the
Operation-by-Operation CBAD process described in Sect. 3.9. Instead of creating a
single CBAD statistic zV , a collection of CBAD statistics {z1V , z2V , ..., zN10V } were
generated using NOp=10 LLPs. These CBAD statistic sequences
fCD[n]={z1V , z2V , ..., zN10V } were used an input sequences for GRLVQI verification
performance assessment.
Performance of the GRLVQI process was evaluated for both TD fTD[n] and
CD fCD[n] feature sequences using ROC curves and benchmark performance criteria
presented in Sect. 3.10.3.
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4. Results
This chapter provides research results for software anomaly detection and hardware
component discrimination based on the methodology presented in Chapter 3. Sec-
tion 4.1 first introduces the various Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) response
sequences used for generating results and assessing performance. Results for soft-
ware anomaly detection via verification using the Correlation Based Anomaly De-
tection (CBAD) process are presented in Section 4.3 for Time Domain (TD) PLC
input sequences, Section 4.4 for statistical Radio Frequency Distinct Native At-
tributes (RF-DNA) input sequences, and Section 4.5 for Hilbert transformed input
sequences. The chapter concludes with Section 4.6 which demonstrates hardware
component discrimination via verification using a Generalized Relevance Learning
Vector Quantization-Improved (GRLVQI) classification process with both TD and
Correlation Domain (CD) statistical features as inputs.
4.1 PLC Response Sequences
The experimental methodology described in Chapter 3 is first used to demon-
strate applicability of the CBAD process for reliably detecting anomalous software
operating conditions. This is done using the specific ladder logic programs described
in Section 3.2 and collected signals described in Section 3.7.
Results for this research are based on unintentional TD emissions collected
from Allen Bradley SLC-500 PLC Central Processing Unit (CPU) modules. These
emissions are sampled, stored, and post-collection processed using the methodology
and configurations specified in Chapter 3. The emissions are collected from selected
PLC devices executing NOP=5 and NOP=10 Ladder Logic Program (LLP) opera-
tions. The term burst is introduced as a general term to refer to a collected, sampled,
and post-collection processed emission. Specific details of the LLPs used to generate
PLC emissions are provided in Section 3.2.
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There are four types of PLC response sequences generated from the experimen-
tally collected TD emissions and each was used in some manner to evaluate CBAD
and/or GRLVQI processes. The four sequences included: 1) the TD magnitude
response sequences |x[n]|, 2) the magnitude of Hilbert transformed TD response se-
quence |H[x[n]]|, 3) the statistical RF-DNA TD response sequence fTD[n] and 4) the
CD response sequence fCD[n]. All four types of sequences served as input sequences
for evaluation and were derived from PLC bursts as described in Chapter 3.
4.2 Performance Evaluation Criteria
Three evaluation criteria were used to assess software anomaly detection perfor-
mance relative to an arbitrary Benchmark (B) defined by 1) Signal-to-Noise Ratio
(SNRB), 2) True Anomaly Detection Rate (TADRB), and 3) Equal Error Rate
(EERB). The following steps were used to derive resultant performance metrics
relative to the established benchmark:
1. Generate verification results for varying SNR using a given anomaly detection
method and input sequence type pairing and plot SNR vs. TADR.
2. Determine the lowest SNR at which the plotted TADR=TADRB. An ar-
bitrary TADRB≥90.0% benchmark was chosen here for assessment. The cor-
responding SNRB at which TADR=TADRB is used for Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curve generation.
3. Generate a ROC curve by plotting False Anomaly Detection Rate (FADR)
vs. TADR at SNRB. The corresponding Equal Error Rate (EER) point is de-
termined as the point on the ROC curve at which FADR=FNV R=1−TADR
where FADR is the False Anomaly Detection Rate. An arbitrary benchmark
of EERB≤10.0% was chosen here for assessment.
Performance: A given anomaly detection method and input se-
quence pair is deemed inadequate if it does not achieve the arbitrary
TADRB≥90.0% or EERB≤10.0% benchmarks.
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4.3 Software Anomaly Detection: TD Sequences
The first evaluations of the CBAD process were conducted using TD magnitude
sequences |x[n]| derived from sampled, post-collection processed PLC emissions as
described in Section 3.5; the input TD sequences are simply transformed by taking
the magnitude of each sample (|x[n]|), with no Hilbert transform applied. Two
methods were initially used to evaluate the plausibility of using CBAD processing to
detect changes in the PLC operating condition: 1) NB=1 TD magnitude sequence
|x[n]| combined with NNr=200 Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) realizations
to achieve the desired Analysis Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNRA), and 2) NB=60 TD
magnitude sequences |x[n]| combined with NNr=10 AWGN realizations to achieve
the desired analysis SNRA. For both methods only one PLC device was used to
generate |x[n]| input sequences.
Notation: Unless noted otherwise, SNR is used exclusively to repre-
sent SNRA throughout the remainder of the document.
Presentation: Subsequent use of NNr notation refers to the total
number of independent, randomly generated AWGN noise realizations
{xB1[n], xB2[n], ...xBNr[n]} used to power-scale selected sequences to
evaluate performance at the desired SNR.
4.3.1 Single Device, NB=1, NOp=5. The anomaly detection process was
initially assessed using a single (NB=1), representative PLC TD magnitude sequence
|x[n]| from the PLC operating under Norm, Anom #1, and Anom #1 conditions
using NOP=5 operations. For the single response detection, the same burst with
varying analysis SNR was used for both training and testing. This was done to
demonstrate the impact of SNR variation and noise degradation on CBAD per-
formance without the effects of input signal variation being present. The initial
demonstration was performed on a single PLC device denoted as WQ. The anomaly
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detection process was repeated for SNR∈[−30.0, 30.0] dB using NNr=200 AWGN
noise realizations per SNR. This yielded a total of Nz=200 independent CBAD
verification statistics (zV ) for each operating condition at each SNR considered.
Figure 4.1 shows anomaly detection SNR vs. TADR performance for
SNR∈[−30.0, 30.0] dB. As indicated, the TADRB≥90.0% benchmark is achieved
for SNR≥−10.0 dB. Based on these results, anomaly detection ROC performance
was evaluated at SNR=−10.0 dB using TD magnitude sequence |x[n]| and the same
conditions as used for Fig. 4.1 results; the PLC operating under Norm, Anom #1,
and Anom #1 conditions using NOP=5 LLP operations. ROC performance results
are presented in Fig. 4.2 and reflect EER≤3.2% which meets the EERB≤10.0%
benchmark.
Figure 4.1: SNR vs. TADR performance using TD magnitude sequence |x[n]| for
NB=1 burst with the PLC operating under Norm, Anom #1, and Anom #1 con-
ditions using NOP=5 LLP operations. The TADRB>90.0% benchmark is achieved
for SNR≥−10.0 dB.
4.3.2 Single Device, NB=60, NOp=5. The anomaly detection process per-
formed in Section 4.3.1 was repeated using NB=60 TD sequences per operating
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Figure 4.2: Anomaly detection ROC curve for the SNR=−10.0 dB operating point
in Fig. 4.1. Results generated using the TD magnitude sequence |x[n]| with NB=1
burst and the PLC operating under Norm, Anom #1, and Anom #1 conditions
using NOP=5 LLP operations. The EERB≤10.0% benchmark is achieved.
condition for the Norm, Anom #1, and Anom #1 NOP=5 operating conditions.
There were NTng=3 bursts selected as training burst, leaving NTst=57 bursts per
operating condition for CBAD processing evaluation. As in the single response case,
the multiple response process was repeated for SNR∈[−30.0, 30.0] dB and contains
representative bursts collected from the WQ device. For each SNR considered,
anomaly detection was based on NNr=10 AWGN noise realizations per SNR. This
yielded a total of Nz=570 test statistics for each operating condition at each SNR
considered.
Figure 4.3 shows SNR vs. TADR performance for SNR∈[−30.0, 30.0] dB.
The TADRB≥90.0% benchmark is not achieved for any SNR considered. This is
due to variation in the NB=60 TD waveforms. Each burst represents a unique,
collected signal with content that, while attributable to the operations in the LLP,
is not identical to the content in the other bursts. The CBAD process is designed to
detect variations from the normal conditions. TheNTst=57 test input sequences vary
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enough from the NTng=3 training input sequences that even the Norm sequences
are incorrectly declared anomalous.
Figure 4.3: SNR vs. TADR performance using TD magnitude sequence |x[n]| for
NB=60 bursts with the PLC operating under Norm, Anom #1, and Anom #1
conditions using NOP=5 LLP operations. The TADRB>90.0% benchmark is not
achieved for any SNR∈[−30.0, 30.0] dB.
Based on results in Fig. 4.3, ROC curve performance was assessed at SNR
=30.0 dB for the multiple response TD waveform bursts. Although TADR perfor-
mance did not achieve the TADRB≥90.0% benchmark for any SNR considered,
SNR=30.0 dB yielded the highest TADR performance and was chosen to complete
ROC analysis. As seen in Fig. 4.4, the EERB≤10.0% benchmark is not achieved for
SNR=30.0 dB.
Figure 4.5 shows experimentally derived Probability Mass Function (PMF)
P [ZV=zV ] for the pool of test statistics under Norm, Anom #1 and Anom #2
operating conditions using NB=60 TD bursts and NNr=10 AWGN noise realizations
scaled to achieve SNR=30.0 dB. Due to variation in collected waveform responses
under specified operating conditions, the variance in zV here is greater than what was
observed for the NB=1 case. As the PMF response indicate, the Norm condition
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Figure 4.4: Anomaly detection ROC curve for SNR=30.0 dB operating point in
Fig. 4.3. Results obtained using TD magnitude sequence |x[n]| for NB=60 bursts
with the PLC operating under Norm, Anom #1, and Anom #1 conditions using
NOP=5 LLP operations. The EERB≤10.0% benchmark is not achieved.
zV range significantly overlaps the range of zV for both Anom #1 and Anom #2
conditions. The zV ranges for normal and anomalous operations overlap and are not
completely separable for any SNR considered.
Performance: The Untransformed TD Sequences were insufficient
for reliably detecting anomalous operating conditions and the desired
benchmark performance was not achieved using multiple bursts [87,89].
4.4 Software Anomaly Detection: RF-DNA Sequences
Failure of the software anomaly detection process when using multiple collected
PLC emissions motivated the need for an alternate representation of anomalous
and normal operating conditions. Previous research efforts have found success in
classification and verification processes based on using statistical features extracted
from collected waveforms [11, 58, 79, 102]. The next step in this research effort was
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Figure 4.5: Representative PMFs for the PLC WQ device operating under Norm,
Anom #1 and Anom #2 operating conditions using NB=60 TD bursts and NNr=10
AWGN noise realizations scaled to achieve SNR=30.0 dB. There is significant over-
lap between the anomalous PMF zV and normal PMF zV ; perfect anomalous-normal
separation and reliable verification is not achievable.
to consider using sequences formed from the statistical features of the waveforms as
the input to the anomaly detection process.
As stated in Section 3.3, the anomaly detection process is signal agnostic and
can operate on any discrete input sequence. For the feature-based anomaly detection
process, the set of input sequences {xN [n], xR[n], xC [n]} are a series of values rep-
resenting the statistical attributes of a given TD sequence, i.e., {fTDN [n], fRDN [n],
fCDN [n]}, respectively. As outlined in Section 3.6.2, the Feature Extraction and
Statistical Fingerprint Generation processes are used to create a Composite Finger-
print based on the collected emission [11, 103]. The Composite Fingerprint reduces
the dimensionality of the sequence used in the anomaly detection process. The TD
sequences considered for this research are represented by an ND=7500 dimensional
vector, where the dimensionality is a function of the sampling rate fs and time length
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TWF of the TD emission 4.1.
ND = fs × TWF (4.1)
The process is graphically depicted in Fig. 3.11 and produces an ND=156 di-
mensional vector using NR=12 sub regions and the total signal, NStat=4 statistical
attributes per region, and NFeat=3 signal attributes per region (4.2). The compos-
ite fingerprint feature vector fTD[n] serves as the input sequence to the anomaly
detection process.
ND = (NR + 1)×NStat ×NFeat (4.2)
4.4.1 Single Device, NB=60, NOp=5. The anomaly detection process in
Section 4.3.2 was repeated using the same NB=60 bursts per operating condition
for the Norm, Anom #1, and Anom #1 NOP=5 conditions. There were NTng=3
bursts per operating condition selected for training and NTst=57 bursts per operat-
ing condition selected for testing to evaluate CBAD processing. The multiple burst
processing was repeated for SNR∈[−25.0, 25.0] dB using NNr=10 AWGN noise re-
alizations per SNR. This yielded a total of Nz=570 test statistics for each set of
RF-DNA feature vectors {fTD1[n], fTD2[n], ...fTD570[n]} under each operating condi-
tion at each SNR considered. The process varies from the TD Waveform process
in that a Composite Fingerprint fTD is generated for each of the waveforms. The
Composite Fingerprint is used as the input sequence to the anomaly detector.
Figure 4.6 shows the resultant SNR vs. TADR for SNR∈[−25.0 25.0] dB. As
indicated, the TADRB≥90.0% benchmark is achieved for SNR≥8.2 dB.
Based on performance in Fig. 4.6, ROC curve performance for the NB=60
case was assessed for SNR=8.2 dB. The resultant ROC curve in Fig. 4.7 shows
EER≤10.0% which satisfies the EERB≤10.0% benchmark.
TD waveform magnitude sequences |x[n]| are not an effective input for the
CBAD process due to variation between collected bursts. When evaluating the po-
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Figure 4.6: SNR vs. TADR performance using TD magnitude sequence |x[n]| for
NB=60 bursts with the PLC operating under Norm, Anom #1, and Anom #1 con-
ditions using NOP=5 LLP operations. The TADRB>90.0% benchmark is achieved
for SNR≥8.2 dB.
tential for using the RF-DNA features as input sequences, a specific feature sequence
fRTD was selected as the reference based on observed TADR performance. The re-
sults indicate that using the RF-DNA features fTD[n] as input sequences results
in improved performance when compared to using the TD waveform magnitude se-
quences as inputs when the reference burst is specifically selected based on analysis
of the normal and anomalous bursts. The envisioned approach is for the training to
rely on the known normal bursts only.
Figure 4.8 shows TADR results for SNR∈[−30.0, 30.0] dB using the CBAD
reference selection process to automatically select the reference training burst train-
ing on observed normal conditions only. The TADRB≥90.0% benchmark is not
achieved for any SNR∈[−30.0, 30.0] dB.
The resultant TADR performance in Fig. 4.8 is poorer than the TADRB≥90.0%
benchmark for all SNR considered. Given that SNR=30.0 dB yielded the highest
TADR, it was used to generate the ROC curve results for the NB=60 case shown in
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Figure 4.7: Anomaly detection ROC curve for SNR=8.2 dB operating point in
Fig. 4.6. Results obtained using TD RF-DNA feature sequences fTD[n] for NB=60
bursts with the PLC operating under Norm, Anom #1, and Anom #1 conditions
using NOP=5 LLP operations. The EERB≤10.0% benchmark is achieved.
Fig. 4.9. TheEERB≤10.0% benchmark is not achieved for any SNR∈[−30.0, 30.0] dB.
Using the feature-based detection, the selection of the reference burst substan-
tially affects performance. In the envisioned use-case, the reference would be built
based on observed normal operation using an automated process. A more robust
method of detecting anomalous behavior is required.
Performance: The RF-DNA Feature Sequences were insufficient for re-
liably detecting anomalous operating conditions and the desired bench-
mark performance was not achieved using multiple bursts [87,89].
4.5 Software Anomaly Detection: Hilbert Sequences
The failure of the anomaly detection process for multiple collected response
waveforms using waveforms and the lack of robust characteristics when using fea-
tures necessitates another means of representing the anomalous and normal operating
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Figure 4.8: SNR vs. TADR performance using TD magnitude sequence |x[n]| for
NB=60 bursts with the PLC operating under Norm, Anom #1, and Anom #1 con-
ditions, NOP=5 LLP operations, with training only based on Norm input sequences.
The TADRB>90.0% benchmark is not achieved for any SNR∈[−30.0, 30.0] dB.
conditions. Recall the Hilbert transform used in audio signal processing applications
to stabilize signal’s amplitude estimates [31,71]. The next step in this research effort
is to evaluate the feasibility of using the Hilbert transform to improve anomaly detec-
tion performance. The Hilbert transform is performed as specified in Section 3.6.1 on
TD waveform sequences, x[n] to generate Hilbert transformed magnitude sequences,
|H[x[n]]|. The input sequence for TD-Based anomaly detection is the magnitude
of the collected real-valued TD emission, |x[n]|. For brevity, the sequences are de-
noted as TD sequences |x[n]| to differentiate from corresponding Hilbert sequences
|H[x[n]]|.
4.5.1 Single Device, NB=60, NOp=5. To evaluate the impact of using noise
degraded signals in the anomaly detection process, the CBAD process is performed
using Hilbert transformed magnitude input sequences |H[x[n]]| generated by taking
the Hilbert transform of TD waveform sequences combined with AWGN sequences
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Figure 4.9: Anomaly detection ROC curve for SNR=30.0 dB operating point in
Fig. 4.8. Results obtained using TD RF-DNA feature sequences fTD[n] for NB=60
bursts with the PLC operating under Norm, Anom #1, and Anom #1 conditions
using NOP=5 LLP operations. The EERB≤10.0% benchmark is not achieved.
to for SNR∈[−30.0, 30.0] dB as in the waveform input sequence analysis. There are
a total NB=60 TD waveforms with NTng=3 bursts selected as training burst, leav-
ing NTst=57 bursts per operating condition for CBAD processing evaluation. For
each SNR considered, the anomaly detection process used NNr=10 AWGN realiza-
tions per SNR. This yielded a total of Nz=570 Hilbert sequences and associated
CBAD test statistics for each permutation of operating condition, device, and SNR
considered.
Figure 4.3 shows results for the anomaly detection process when the TD se-
quences are used as inputs. Using the TD sequences results in an unacceptable
anomaly detection rate of TADR≤90.0% for all SNR considered.
The anomaly detection process was repeated using the same NB=60 collected
PLC emissions per operating condition, per device, under the Norm, Anom #1, and
Anom #1 operating conditions. The same SNR and same AWGN noise realizations
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were used for each operating condition and each device to generate the Hilbert
magnitude sequences {|H[x1[n]]|, |H[x2[n]]|, ...|H[x60[n]]|}.
Figure 4.10 shows results for the TADR at SNR∈[−30.0, 30.0] dB when the
Hilbert sequences |H[x[n]]| are used as inputs. The TADRB≥90.0% benchmark is
achieved for SNR≥0.0 dB.
Figure 4.10: SNR vs. TADR performance using Hilbert magnitude sequences
|H[x[n]]| for NB=60 bursts with the PLC operating under Norm, Anom #1
and Anom #1 conditions using NOP=5 LLP operations, with training only based
on Norm input sequences. The TADRB>90.0% benchmark is achieved for
SNR≥0.0 dB.
Based on performance in Fig. 4.10, ROC curve performance for the NB=60
case was assessed for SNR=0.0 dB. The resultant ROC curve in Fig. 4.11 shows
that the EERB≤10.0% benchmark was achieved.
4.5.2 Ten Devices, NB=1000, NOp=10. Previous results were based on
input sequences x[n] from a single PLC device (WQ) using the NOP=5 LLP opera-
tions shown in Fig. 2(a). For the following results, the device pool was increased to
NDev=10 PLC devices {WQ,WV,KG,QI,KV,OV,RG,ZC,ZZ,ZA} of the same
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Figure 4.11: Anomaly detection ROC curve for SNR=0.0 dB operating point in
Fig. 4.10. Results obtained using Hilbert magnitude sequences |H[x[n]]| for NB=60
bursts with the PLC operating under Norm, Anom #1, and Anom #1 conditions
using NOP=5 LLP operations. The EERB≤10.0% benchmark is achieved.
brand and model number as summarized in Table 3.1. Additionally, the LLPs used
for simulating Norm, Anom #1, and Anom #2 operating conditions was based on
the NOP=10 operations shown in Fig. 2(b).
To evaluate the impact of using noise degraded signals with the anomaly de-
tection process, CBAD processing was performed using Hilbert transformed input
sequences |H[x[n]]| generated by taking the Hilbert transform of TD waveform se-
quences combined with AWGN sequences for SNR∈[−30.0, 30.0] dB as in the wave-
form input sequence and previous Hilbert Transform-based emissions. Results in
previous sections were based on either NB=1 or NB=60 bursts. The anomaly detec-
tion process was performed using NB=1000 collected PLC emissions per operating
condition per device for the Norm, Anom #1, and Anom #2 operating conditions.
A total of NTng%=5% or NTng=50 Hilbert sequences were selected as training bursts,
leaving NTst=950 sequences per operating condition for the CBAD processing eval-
uation. For each SNR considered, the anomaly detection process was implemented
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using NNr=10 AWGN noise realizations per SNR. This yielded Nz=9500 total
test statistics for each permutation of operating condition, device, and SNR con-
sidered. The same SNR levels and AWGN noise realizations for each operating
condition for each device at each SNR were used to generate the Hilbert test se-
quences {|H[x1[n]]|, |H[x2[n]]|, ...|H[x950[n]]|}.
Figure 4.12 shows results for the TADR at SNR∈[−30.0, 30.0] dB when the
Hilbert sequences |H[x[n]]| are used as inputs. The TADRB≥90.0% benchmark is
achieved for SNR≥5.0 dB and all NDev=10 devices.
Figure 4.12: SNR vs. TADR performance using Hilbert magnitude sequences
|H[x[n]]| for NB=1000 bursts with all PLCs operating under Norm, Anom #1 and
Anom #1 conditions using NOP=10 LLP operations, with training only based on
Norm input sequences. The TADRB≥90.0% benchmark is achieved for all devices
at SNR≥5.0 dB.
Based on performance in Fig. 4.12, ROC curve performance for the NB=1000
case was assessed for SNR=5.0 dB. The resultant ROC curve in Fig. 4.13 shows that
the arbitrary EERB≤10.0% benchmark is achieved for all NDev=10 considered.
Anomaly detection ROC curves for SNR=5.0 dB operating point in Fig. 4.13
demonstrate results obtained using Hilbert magnitude sequences |H[x[n]]| forNB=1000
83
Figure 4.13: Anomaly detection ROC curves for SNR=5.0 dB operating point in
Fig. 4.12. Results obtained using Hilbert magnitude sequences |H[x[n]]| forNB=1000
bursts with the PLCs operating under Norm, Anom #1, and Anom #1 conditions
using NOP=10 LLP operations. The EERB≤10.0% benchmark is achieved for all
devices.
bursts with the PLCs operating under Norm, Anom #1, and Anom #1 conditions
using NOP=10 LLP operations. The EERB≤10.0% benchmark is achieved for all
devices.
Performance: The Hilbert Transform Feature Sequences with cross-
operation CBAD processing were sufficiently robust for reliably de-
tecting anomalous operating conditions. The desired TADRB≥90.0%
and EERB≤10.0% performance benchmarks were achieved using
1) NB=60 sequences for SNR≥0.0 dB, and 2)NB=1000 sequences for
SNR≥5.0 dB.
The operation-by-operation CBAD processing in Sect. 3.9 effectively weights
the differences for each operation (as quantified by CBAD statistic zV ) equally ir-
respective of how much of the total operating condition sequence is attributable to
the specific operation.
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Figure 4.14 shows results for the TADR at SNR∈[−30.0, 30.0] dB when the
Hilbert sequences |H[x[n]]| are used as inputs and CBAD statistics are calculated
for each operation region {RegOP1, RegOP2, ..., RegOP10}. The TADRB≥90.0%
benchmark is achieved for SNR≥0.0 dB for all NDev=10 considered. This repre-
sents a gain of SNRGain=5.0 dB when compared with the results without using the
operation-by-operation process.
Figure 4.14: SNR vs. TADR performance for Operation-by-Operation CBAD Pro-
cessing using Hilbert magnitude sequences |H[x[n]]|. Results for NB=1000 bursts
with all PLCs operating under Norm, Anom #1 and Anom #1 conditions using
NOP=10 LLP operations. The TADRB>90.0% benchmark is achieved for all devices
at SNR≥0.0 dB.
Based on performance in Fig. 4.14, ROC curve performance for the NB=1000
case was assessed for SNR=0.0 dB. The resultant ROC curve in Fig. 4.15 shows an
EER≤6.3% for all NDev=10 devices and the EERB≤10.0% benchmark is achieved.
Anomaly detection ROC curves for Operation-by-Operation CBAD Processing
at SNR=0.0 dB operating point are shown in Fig. 4.15. Results are obtained using
Hilbert magnitude sequences |H[x[n]]| for NB=1000 bursts with the PLCs operating
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Figure 4.15: Anomaly detection ROC curves for Operation-by-Operation CBAD Pro-
cessing at SNR=0.0 dB operating point in Fig. 4.14. Results obtained using Hilbert
magnitude sequences |H[x[n]]| for NB=1000 bursts with the PLCs operating under
Norm, Anom #1, and Anom #1 conditions using NOP=10 LLP operations. The
EERB≤10.0% benchmark is achieved for all devices.
under Norm, Anom #1, and Anom #1 conditions using NOP=10 LLP operations.
The EERB≤10.0% benchmark is achieved for all devices.
Performance: The Hilbert Transform Feature Sequences with
operation-by-operation CBAD processing were sufficiently robust for re-
liably detecting anomalous operating conditions. The TADRB≥90.0%
and EERB≤10.0% benchmarks were achieved using NB=1000 se-
quences for SNR≥0.0 dB; a 5.0 dB gain relative to performance using
cross-operation CBAD processing.
4.6 Hardware Component Discrimination
Results in the preceding sections focused on software anomaly detection in PLC
devices–discriminating between various operating conditions to detect malfunction-
ing or malicious software, firmware, etc. A complementary application emerged as
the research progressed and the verification-based anomaly detection process was ap-
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plied to support hardware component discrimination–discriminating between various
hardware components to detect malfunctioning or counterfeit, trojan, etc., Integrated
Circuits (IC) such as commonly used in PLCs.
Hardware component discrimination was assessed using the GRLVQI process
as developed and verified in [76]; the process was implemented here as published
without any modification. From a fundamental classification perspective, the GR-
LVQI model development and verification process is “signal agnostic” and can accept
any collection of input sequences. Thus, for consistency and comparison with pre-
vious software anomaly detection results, two different input sequence types were
considered for hardware component discrimination: 1) Time Domain (TD) feature
sequences and 2) Correlation Domain (CD) feature sequences.
The TD RF-DNA sequences fTD[n] were generated in the same manner de-
scribed in Sect. 4.4 and contained ND=156 features. The statistical features were
generated using the RF-DNA process in Sect. 3.6.2 with TD x[n] sequences as inputs.
GRLVQI performance was also assessed using CD feature sequences fCD[n] that were
generated using the Operation-by-Operation CBAD process in Sect. 3.9. Instead of
creating a single CBAD statistic zV , a vector of CBAD statistics {z1V , z2V , ...zN10V }
was generated from the NOp=10 LLPs. These resultant CBAD statistical sequences
fCD[n]={z1V , z2V , ...zN10V } were used as inputs for GRLVQI verification performance
assessment.
4.6.1 GRLVQI Verification: TD Sequences. The initial hardware dis-
crimination is performed using RF-DNA features extracted from the TD waveform
sequences {x1[n], x2[n], ...xNB [n]}, NB=1000. There are a total of NTng=500 TD
waveform sequences used, leaving NTst=500 TD waveforms for testing. The train-
ing and testing waveforms are combined with NNr=10 AWGN realizations per x[n]
sequence.
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Devices were divided into two arbitrary classes, including the 1) authorized
hardware devices ({WQ, WV, KV, OV, RG}) and the unauthorized 2) rogue hard-
ware devices ({KG, QI, ZA, ZC, ZZ}). For this research, authorized devices refers
to the set of hardware devices {WQ, WV, KV, OV, RG} which are considered nor-
mal or non-anomalous while rogue devices refers to the set of hardware devices
{KG, QI, ZA, ZC, ZZ} which are considered anomalous. In reality, all devices
are assumed to be non-counterfeit and are purchased through normal commercial
channels. For both Authorized Device Verification and Rogue Device Rejection as-
sessment the GRLVQI verification model was developed using only authorized device
training sequences. In addition, when performing Rogue Device Rejection assessment
achieving the EERB≤10.0% benchmark is equivalent to achieving a Rogue Rejection
Rate (RRR) of RRR>90.0%.
RF-DNA features were were extracted using the processes of Feature Extraction
and Statistical Fingerprint Generation are used to create a Composite Fingerprint
based on the waveform [11, 76, 103] and outlined in Section 3.6.2. The Composite
Fingerprint reduces the dimensionality of the sequence used in the anomaly detection
process. The waveform sequences considered for this research are represented by an
ND=15880 dimensional vector. The dimensionality of the waveform-based sequence
vector is based on the sampling rate fs and time length TWF of the TD waveform
using 4.1.
The process graphically demonstrated in Fig. 3.11 results in a ND=156 di-
mensional vector using NR=12 sub regions and the total signal, NStat=4 statistical
attributes per region, and NFeat=3 signal attributes per region (4.2). The compos-
ite fingerprint feature vector serves as the input sequence to the anomaly detection
process.
The Authorized Device Verification capability of GRLVQI processing was first
evaluated using TD RF-DNA sequences fTD[n] with the {WQ, WV, KV, OV, RG}
PLCs serving as authorized devices, i.e., devices from which emission sequences are
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extracted and used for model development. Recall that in the general verification
process in Chapter 3 dictates that each device or operation has a claimed identity
and actual identity. Figure 4.16 shows Authorized Device Verification ROC curve
results for SNR=15.0 dB using TD feature sequences fTD[n] as input to the GRLVQI
process. The claimed and actual identities are equal. The ROC curve results are a
measure of how similar an authorized device resembles the other authorized devices
in the test as compared to how closely the device resembles itself. A low EER
equates to a device with a unique set of features that are not commonly mistaken
for features from another device. A high EER equates to a device that with a set
of features that are similar to the other devices in the test.
For the case of authorized device discrimination, the EERB≤10.0% benchmark
is achieved for all of the devices at SNR=15.0 dB.
Figure 4.16: GRLVQI hardware component discrimination ROC curves for Autho-
rized Device Verification using the {WQ, WV, KV, OV, RG} PLCs with TD RF-
DNA sequences fTD[n]. Results for SNR=15.0 dB using NB=1000 bursts with the
PLCs operating under Norm, Anom #1, and Anom #1 conditions using NOP=10
LLP operations. The EERB≤10.0% benchmark is achieved with EER≤4% for all
devices.
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The GRLVQI process was next evaluated to assess Rogue Device Rejection
capability using TD RF-DNA sequences fTD[n] with the {WQ, WV, KV, OV, RG}
PLCs serving as rogues, i.e., devices which have not been previously seen nor used for
authorized device model development. Figure 4.17 shows Rogue Devices ROC curve
results for SNR=15.0 dB using TD features as in the GRLVQI process. The claimed
and actual device IDs are not the same and the ROC curve results are presented
as represent DevX:DevY (Actual :Claimed) ID pairs. The GRLVQI process was
evaluated with each one of the rogue devices presenting a claimed ID for all five
authorized devices. Thus, there were a total of 25 DevX:DevY ID pairs considered.
For visual clarity, the legend is not displayed in Fig. 4.17. The ROC curve results are
a measure of how much a rogue device resembles an authorized devices in the test. A
low EER indicates a rogue device is unlikely to be falsely verified as an authorized
device. A high EER indicates a rogue device is likely to be accepted/authorized as
an authorized device.
For the case of Rogue Device Rejection, the EERB≤10.0% benchmark was
achieved at SNR=15.0 dB for all of device pairs. For all devices except the KG:WQ
pair, the EER≤3.0%. For the KG:WQ pair, the EER≈9.0%. This is a result of
RF-DNA features from device KG being most similar to the WQ RF-DNA features
and there is a higher likelihood that rogue KG would be being falsely verified as
authorized device WQ than any other rogue device being falsely verified as another
authorized device.
4.6.2 GRLVQI Verification: CD Sequences. The second and final hard-
ware discrimination evaluation is performed using CBAD statistics extracted from
the Hilbert Transform sequences {|H[x1[n]]|, |H[x2[n]]|, ..., |H[xNB [n]]||}, NB=1000
combined with NNr=10 AWGN realizations per x[n] sequence, authorized hardware
devices ({WQ, WV, KV, OV, RG}) and rogue hardware devices ({KG, QI, ZA,
ZC, ZZ}). For this research effort, the term authorized devices refers to the set of
hardware devices {WQ, WV, KV, OV, RG}, which are considered normal or non-
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Figure 4.17: GRLVQI hardware component discrimination ROC curves for Rogue
Device Rejection using TD RF-DNA sequences fTD[n]. The DevX:DevY leg-
end notation has been omitted for visual clarity. Results are for SNR=15.0 dB
using NB=1000 bursts with the PLCs operating under Norm, Anom #1, and
Anom#1 conditions using NOP=10 LLP operations. The EERB≤10.0% benchmark
is achieved for all cases. The highest EERKG:WQ≈9.0% is for the pair KG:WQ –a
consequence of KG and WQ RF-DNA features being most similar.
anomalous. The term rogue devices refers to the set of hardware devices {KG, QI,
ZA, ZC, ZZ}, which are considered anomalous.
Previously, statistical RF-DNA features were successfully used as the input
sequences for GRLVQI processing. For this research, the input sequences are gen-
erated using the CBAD process to generate a set of CBAD CD statistics {z1V , z2V ,
..., zNOpV }, NOp=10 with each CBAD statistic generated from the signal content
for one of the operations in the LLP. Each CBAD statistic was generated using the
process described in Section 4.5.2. As is the case for the RF-DNA feature extrac-
tion, the CBAD statistic process reduces the dimensionality of the sequence used in
the anomaly detection process. The waveform sequences considered for this research
are represented by an ND=15880 dimensional vector. The dimensionality of the
waveform-based sequence vector is based on the sampling rate fs and time length
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TWF of the TD waveform 4.1. The CBAD statistic vectors are ND=10 dimensional
vectors. When compared to the TD RF-DNA features, the CBAD CD RF-DNA
features are less than 1/15th the size for identical input x[n] sequences.
The Authorized Device Verification capability of GRLVQI processing was next
evaluated using CD RF-DNA sequences fCD[n] with the {WQ, WV, KV, OV, RG}
PLCs serving as authorized devices, i.e., devices from which emission sequences are
extracted and used for model development. Figure 4.18 shows the authorized devices
ROC curve for SNR=15.0 dB with TD features input to the GRLVQI process. The
claimed and actual identities are equal.
For the case of authorized device verification, the EERB≤10.0% benchmark
is achieved for all of the devices except for devices {KV, WV } at SNR=15.0 dB.
CBAD statistic vectors for authorized devices KV and WV are similar to other
authorized devices in the test.
The final GRLVQI assessment included Rogue Device Rejection capability us-
ing CD RF-DNA sequences fCD[n] with the {KG, QI, ZA, ZC, ZZ} PLCs serving
as rogue devices, i.e., devices which have not been previously seen nor used for autho-
rized device model development. Figure 4.19 shows rogue device ROC curve results
for SNR=15.0 dB using CBAD statistic vectors as input to the GRLVQI process.
As in the RF-DNA features case, there are a total of NPerm=25 permutations when
considering Actual :Claimed identity pairs for authorized device set {WQ, WV, KV,
OV, RG} and rogue device set {KG, QI, ZA, ZC, ZZ}.
For the case of rogue device detection, the EERB≤10.0% benchmark is achieved
for all of the devices pairs at SNR=15.0 dB. As is the case for RF-DNA features,
the CBAD statistic vectors for device KG are most similar to the CBAD statistic
vectors for the authorized devices. Device KG most closely resembling WQ equating
to a higher likelihood of the rogue device KG being falsely verified as the authorized
device WQ than the other authorized device.
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Figure 4.18: GRLVQI hardware component discrimination ROC curves for Autho-
rized Device Rejection using the {WQ, WV, KV, OV, RG} PLCs with CD feature
sequences fCD[n]. Results for SNR=15.0 dB using NB=1000 bursts with the PLCs
operating under Norm, Anom #1, and Anom #1 conditions using NOP=10 LLP
operations. The EERB≤10.0% benchmark is achieved for all devices except {KV,
WV }–a consequence of KV and WV CD features being relatively similar to other
authorized devices.
Performance: With the exception of assessments involving the CBAD
features for {KV, WV } devices and authorized device discrimination,
GRLVQI processing using both TD RF-DNA and CD CBAD input
sequences was effective for verifying authorized device IDs with the
EERB≤10.0% benchmark achieved for SNR=15.0 dB. The {KV, WV }
device CBAD features were insufficiently distinct from each of the au-
thorized devices. Both TD RF-DNA and CD CBAD input sequences
were effective for performing Actual :Claimed rogue ID assessment, with
the EERB≤10.0% benchmark achieved for SNR=15.0 dB.
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Figure 4.19: GRLVQI hardware component discrimination ROC curves for Rogue
Device Rejection using CD RF-DNA sequences fTD[n]. The DevX:DevY legend
notation has been omitted for visual clarity. Results are for SNR=15.0 dB using
NB=1000 bursts with the PLCs operating under Norm, Anom #1, and Anom #1
conditions using NOP=10 LLP operations. The highest EERKG:WQ≈9.0% is for the
pair KG:WQ –a consequence of KG and WQ CD features being most similar.
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5. Conclusion
This chapter provides a summary of research activity and results for development
and demonstration of a verification-based anomaly detection approach that supports
1) software anomaly detection–discriminating between various operating conditions
to detect malfunctioning or malicious software, firmware, etc., and 2) hardware com-
ponent discrimination–discriminating between various hardware components to de-
tect malfunctioning or counterfeit, trojan, etc., Integrated Circuits (IC).
Section 5.1 provides a research summary in support of providing results and
conclusions for 1) the proposed Correlation Based Anomaly Detection (CBAD) pro-
cess in Sect. 5.2 which was used to assess device operating condition discrimination
and 2) the Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantized-Improved (GRLVQI)
process in Sect.5.3 which was used to assess hardware component discrimination.
The chapter concludes with recommendations for future research in Sect. 5.4 which
are motivated by the research developments and demonstrations completed herein.
5.1 Research Summary
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems remain vulner-
able to malicious cyber attacks [13, 33, 44, 60, 93, 94] and are an integral element of
critical infrastructures in the United States and around the world. They are responsi-
ble for controlling activities from waste-water treatment to nuclear power generation.
The concern over these vulnerabilities is greatest when considering the critical na-
ture of SCADA when integrated within an Industrial Control System (ICS). The
current and previous US presidents have highlighted the critical nature of SCADA
security through presidential directives and executive orders directing efforts toward
securing critical infrastructure facilities and systems [5, 66]; despite this motivation
and related technical advancements legacy SCADA systems remain vulnerable.
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One key vulnerability rests within Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) de-
vices that are used to implement low-level SCADA and ICS functions such as op-
erating valves, monitoring temperatures, activating relays, etc. PLCs provided the
avenue through which recent SCADA cyber attacks have been orchestrated [12,105]
and are particularly vulnerable for two primary reasons: 1) PLCs run proprietary
Operating Systems (OS) software using limited/minimal hardware; this precludes
the use of Anti Virus (AV) or Intrusion Detection System (IDS) Programs, and
2) PLC devices and implementation architectures may stay in operation for decades;
the lack of upgrades keep them vulnerable even as well-publicized exploits emerge.
The 7-layer Open System Interconnect (OSI) model provides a common means
for describing various levels of networked infrastructure functionality [7]. While
most methods securing networked systems from attack reside within the upper Net-
work (NET) or Application (APP) model layers, this approach is problematic for
many fielded systems due to the limited on-board computing resources within PLC
devices. One avenue of augmenting Network/Application layer security is by ex-
ploiting information in the lower Physical (PHY) layer. This is one focus area
of AFIT’s Radio Frequency Intelligence (RFINT) program that has developed a
solid knowledge base on targeting and exploiting PHY layer attributes to address
bit-level security augmentation, device discrimination, and Side Channel Analysis
(SCA) [9–11,21,39–42,56–58,74,77,79,81,91,92,103].
The goal of this research was to expand AFIT’s RFINT technology base by de-
veloping and analyzing a process for reliably detecting anomalous activity in SCADA
PLC devices using PHY layer attributes. This was addressed using a verification-
based approach for both software anomaly detection and hardware component dis-
crimination using the proposed CBAD for detecting anomalous PLC activity. The
CBAD process was introduced to detect anomalous behavior that differs from ob-
served normal behavior by verifying normal operations and detecting anomalous
operations; a binary declaration process where a cause-independent determination
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of abnormal is desired. The CBAD process is inherently sequence agnostic and was
demonstrated for a variety of input sequence types: Time Domain (TD) [86, 87],
Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) features [87], and Hilbert
transformed TD sequences [88].
Additional research contribution was made by leveraging previous GRLVQI [76,
78] and Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) [9,11,77,81] research
to assess hardware component discrimination capability. In this case, the CBAD
process was used to detect anomalous behavior that differs from normal behavior
by verifying authentic hardware devices and detecting rogue hardware devices. The
GRLVQI process was evaluated using both TD RF-DNA features and Correlation
Domain (CD) features.
Performance of verification-based software anomaly detection and hardware
component discrimination capability was assessed by 1) evaluating Signal-to-noise
Ratio (SNR) vs. True Anomaly Detection Rate (TADR), 2) selecting a desired
TADR, and 3) generating a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve at the
corresponding SNR. The resultant ROC curve Equal Error Rate (EER) point, i.e.,
the point at which the two errors associated with verification are equal was arbitrarily
chosen for comparative assessment as common in the biometric verification [48].
Assessment Criteria: The arbitrary performance bench-
marks for characterizing anomaly detection performance included
TADRB≥90.0% and EERB≤10.0%.
5.2 CBAD Software Anomaly Detection
A variety of input sequences were used to evaluate the CBAD process for soft-
ware anomaly detection using operating condition discrimination, each measured
against two arbitrary benchmarks: 1) the lowest SNR value at which the CBAD pro-
cess and given input sequence type combination yielded TADR≥90.0% and 2) ROC
curve EER≤10.0% for the CBAD process when calculated at the SNR for which
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TADR≥90.0% is achieved. All processing included the addition of like-filtered Ad-
ditive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) realizations that were power scaled to achieve
the desired SNR in the input sequences and, in the case of a single response, simulate
multiple collected emissions.
A total of six different types of sequences were input to CBAD processing to as-
sess software anomaly detection capability. Except for the one noted exception under
Type #5, all sequences were used for cross-operation CBAD processing assessment.
1. Single TD Waveform Sequence: The |x[n]| sequence was derived from a given
Device Under Test (DUT) for each operating condition (Norm, Anom #1, and
Anom #1) generated using NOP=5 Ladder Logic Program (LLP) operations
and NNz=200 AWGN realizations.
2. Multiple TD Waveform Sequences : A total of NB=60 TD |x[n]| were de-
rived from a single DUT for each operating condition (Norm, Anom #1, and
Anom #1) generated using NOP=5 LLPs and NNz=10 AWGN realizations.
3. Multiple RF-DNA Feature Sequences : A total of NB=60 RF-DNA feature se-
quences were generated from TD waveform sequences x[n] collected from a
single DUT for each operating condition (Norm, Anom #1, and Anom #1)
generated using NOP=5 LLPs and NNz=10 AWGN realizations.
4. Multiple Hilbert Transforms/Single DUT : A total of NB=60 Hilbert trans-
formed sequences |H[x[n]]| were generated from a single DUT for each operat-
ing condition (Norm, Anom #1, and Anom #1) generated using the NOP=5
LLPs and NNz=10 AWGN realizations.
5. Multiple Hilbert Transforms/Multiple DUTs : A total of NB=1000 Hilbert
transformed sequences |H[x[n]]| were generated from NDev=10 DUTs for each
operating condition (Norm, Anom #1, and Anom #1) using NOP=10 LLPs
and NNz=10 AWGN realizations for both cross-operation and operation-by-
operation CBAD processing assessment.
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Results for cross-operation CBAD processing using Type #1 and Type #2
TD sequences were mixed, with Type #1 sequences achieving the TADRB≥90.0%
and EERB≤10.0% benchmarks for all SNR∈[−30, 30]. However, performance using
Type #2 TD sequences was considerably poorer with TADRB≥90.0% never achieved
over the same range of SNR [87, 89].
Performance: The Untransformed TD Sequences were insufficient
for reliably detecting anomalous operating conditions and the desired
benchmark performance was not achieved using multiple bursts [87,89].
Given unacceptable performance using untransformed TD sequences, Type #3
RF-DNA feature sequences were evaluated next and performance compared against
the benchmarks. Results here were favorable with the TADRB≥90.0% and EERB≤10.0%
benchmarks achieved for SNR≥8.2 dB. However, these benchmarks were achieved
using a specific manually selected reference sequence based on CBAD performance
analysis for both Normal Verification and Anomaly Detection using each potential
reference sequence. This training approach is unrealistic for the intended purpose of
detecting unknown anomalies, but the results provide the most optimistic measure
of achievable performance. The CBAD process was subsequently retrained using
only the Norm sequences and the resultant CBAD processing failed to meet the
TADRB≥90.0% benchmark for all SNR∈[−30.0, 30.0] dB.
Performance: The RF-DNA Feature Sequences were insufficient for re-
liably detecting anomalous operating conditions and the desired bench-
mark performance was not achieved using multiple bursts [87,89].
The Hilbert transform-based Type #4 and Type #5 sequences were next con-
sidered given that Hilbert transforms have been successfully used in audio process-
ing applications to stabilize signal amplitude estimates [32, 71]. Type #4 results
were favorable with the TADRB≥90.0% and EERB≤10.0% benchmarks achieved for
SNR≥0.0 dB. While being likewise favorable, Type #5 results were somewhat poorer
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with the TADRB≥90.0% and EERB≤10.0% benchmarks achieved for SNR≥5.0 dB
when using cross-operation CBAD processing.
Performance: The Hilbert Transform Feature Sequences with cross-
operation CBAD processing were sufficiently robust for reliably de-
tecting anomalous operating conditions. The desired TADRB≥90.0%
and EERB≤10.0% performance benchmarks were achieved using
1) NB=60 sequences for SNR≥0.0 dB, and 2)NB=1000 sequences for
SNR≥5.0 dB.
The final CBAD performance evaluation was performed using Type #5 se-
quences with operation-by-operation CBAD processing to assess anomaly detection
capability. In this case, the sequences were divided into NReg=NOP=10 regions based
on the number of samples within each operation region. Resultant Type #5 sequence
assessment included successful TADR≥90.0% and EER≤10.0% benchmark perfor-
mance at SNR≥0.0 dB. Relative to cross-operation CBAD processing results intro-
duced earlier, this represents a “gain” of 5.0 dB in performance–measured here as
the reduction in required SNR, expressed in dB, for two methods based on identical
inputs to achieve the same benchmark performance.
Performance: The Hilbert Transform Feature Sequences with
operation-by-operation CBAD processing were sufficiently robust for re-
liably detecting anomalous operating conditions. The TADRB≥90.0%
and EERB≤10.0% benchmarks were achieved using NB=1000 se-
quences for SNR≥0.0 dB; a 5.0 dB gain relative to performance using
cross-operation CBAD processing.
5.3 GRLVQI Hardware Component Discrimination
Two different input sequences were considered for GRLVQI processing: TD
Statistical RF-DNA Features and CD Statistical CBAD Features. GRLVQI process-
ing enabled Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA) such that the originalNS=15880
dimensional input TD waveform sequences x[n] were reduced to NDRA=156 dimen-
sional RF-DNA Feature Sequences and NDRA=10 dimensional CBAD Feature Se-
quences based on GRLVQI feature relevance rankings.
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The DRA input sequences were generated using TD waveform sequences col-
lected from NDev=10 PLC devices. For evaluating GRLVQI performance the de-
vices were arbitrarily grouped into a set of five authorized devices {WQ, WV, KV,
OV, RG} and five rogue devices {KG, QI, ZA, ZC, ZZ}. GRLVQI processing
results were analyzed using ROC curves with EER providing a single measure of
performance. ROC curves were used for making two assessments: 1) Authorized De-
vice Verification–an assessment of how discernable the authorized devices are from
each other, and 2) Rogue Device Detection–an assessment of how discernable a non-
authorized device is from each of the authorized devices. A single benchmark criteria
of EERB≤10.0% was used to evaluate the GRLVQI process for the RF-DNA and
CD feature sequence inputs.
For authorized device ID verification, the EERB≤10.0% was achieved for all of
the authorized devices at SNR=15.0 dB using the TD RF-DNA sequences. Using the
CD CBAD input sequences for authorized device ID verification, the EERB≤10.0%
was achieved for three of the authorized devices at SNR=15.0 dB; devices {KV,
WV } were the exception and only achieved EERB≈18% (KV ) and EERB≈24%
(WV ) at the same SNR. Rogue device detection performance met both performance
benchmarks. The EERB≤10.0% benchmark achieved for all of the Actual :Claimed
device pairs for both input sequence types at the same SNR. The generally poor
performances for assessments involving device {KV, WV } was attributed to their
CBAD features being similar to the other authorized devices {KV,OV,RG}.
Performance: With the exception of assessments involving the CBAD
features for {KV, WV } devices and authorized device discrimination,
GRLVQI processing using both TD RF-DNA and CD CBAD input
sequences was effective for verifying authorized device IDs with the
EERB≤10.0% benchmark achieved for SNR=15.0 dB. The {KV, WV }
device CBAD features were insufficiently distinct from each of the au-
thorized devices. Both TD RF-DNA and CD CBAD input sequences
were effective for performing Actual :Claimed rogue ID assessment, with
the EERB≤10.0% benchmark achieved for SNR=15.0 dB.
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5.4 Future Research Recommendations
Research results here provide proof-of-concept demonstration for employing the
proposed CBAD process in many anomaly detection applications, i.e., any binary
problem space where a cause-independent determination of abnormal is required.
Verification-based anomaly detection was performed here using TD RF-DNA fea-
tures, with Hilbert transformed sequences input to 1) the CBAD process to assess
software anomaly detection capability, and 2) the GRLVQI process to assess hard-
ware component discrimination capability. The success of demonstrations here pro-
vides opportunity for expanding verification-based approaches and several avenues
of future research are recommended.
1. Alternate Signal Transforms: The analysis here focused on Hilbert transform
and RF-DNA transform features derived from TD waveform responses. Action-
able verification and anomaly detection information may also reside in other
domains, including a) some that have been considered for other signal types
and applications, e.g., 1D Spectral Domain (SD) and various 2D Wavelet, Ga-
bor, etc., or b) some which have yet to be discovered. Features from these
alternate domains, and their impact on CBAD and GRLVQI process, could
be considered and may provide improvement relative to Hilbert and RF-DNA
features considered here.
2. Extension to CBAD Far-Field Features: The CBAD features here were derived
exclusively from near-field emissions and used primarily for verification, with
some brief discussion of how classification may be implemented. A wide variety
of wireless signals have been considered in related classification and verification
research using far-field emission collections. Given that CBAD processing is
inherently sequence agnostic, CBAD features could be easily extracted from
far-field emissions to assess classification and verification. Wireless signals,
particularly, present a promising avenue for future investigation given their
standard-compliant, engineered waveform structure.
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3. Alternate RF-DNA Region of Interest Selection and Segmentation: Currently,
RF-DNA features are extracted from identically sized, evenly distributed re-
gions within a waveform sequence. These RF-DNA features are then concate-
nated to form the entire RF-DNA sequence. By allowing the regions to be
arbitrarily defined, the calculation of signal attributes and statistic features
can be tailored to specific regions of the Intentional Radiated Emissions (IRE)
or Unintentional Radiation Emissions (URE). Assuming different signal paths
are used for different IRE and URE regions, use of arbitrary regions allows
targeting of specific components within a device, offering more potential for
uniquely identify and discriminating between devices.
4. Non-Binary Device Operation Assessment: Development of the binary anomaly
versus normal verification-based assessment process revealed that unique wave-
form “shapes” can be directly attributed to device operations, e.g., the PLC
execution of (MOV ) and square-root (SQR) commands produced distinct
emission responses. Additional research could leverage this unique operation-
to-waveform response mapping to identify and extract the embedded/pro-
grammed code being executed by the device on an operation-by-operation ba-
sis. A simple implementation may include parallel matched-filtering such as
commonly used for digital communication symbol estimation [72], with each
parallel filter branch matched to a specific software operation response.
5. Alternate IC Devices/Near-Field Probing: Research here was based solely on
emissions collected from the P80C32UFAA microcontroller on the PLC main-
board using a single near-field probe. The research could be expanded upon by
considering a) emissions from an alternate IC on the PLC mainboard collected
with a single near-field probe, b) emissions from the same or alternate IC on
the PLC mainboard using multiple near-field probes or a near-field probe ar-
ray, or, c) emissions collected simultaneously from multiple ICs on the PLC
mainboard using either a single near-field probe or near-field probe array.
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6. Extension to Wired Emission/Waveform Responses: As developed and demon-
strated, the CBAD process is inherently sequence agnostic and can process se-
quences derived from any signal, system, etc., including emissions/waveforms
associated with network traffic. There is ongoing SCADA field bus assessment
work at AFIT and related Ethernet device work outside of AFIT [26] that may
benefit from CBAD processing and which could prove valuable for identifying
undesired, potentially malicious activity.
7. Extension to Environmental Effects: As developed and demonstrated, the
CBAD process is focused on software and hardware anomalies based on RF
emissions from IC devices. In addition to changes due to the anomalies men-
tioned here, factors such as temperature, device age, and humidity may also
alter the collected RF emissions. Features from varied environments could be
considered to evaluate the performance of the CBAD process under varying
environmental conditions.
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This dissertation introduces research activity and results for development and demonstration of a verification-based Programmable Logic
Controller (PLC) anomaly detection approach that supports 1) software anomaly detection and 2) hardware anomaly detection. The
Correlation Based Anomaly Detection (CBAD) process developed here is used to detect software-based anomalies, while the Generalized
Relevance Learning Vector Quantized-Improved (GRLVQI) process previously established is used to detect hardware-based anomalies. A
benchmark of EER≤10.0% is used to measure performance for both hardware and software anomaly detection. The CBAD process using
Hilbert transformed Time Domain (TD) input sequences met the benchmark of EERB≤10.0% at SNR=0.0 dB. Untransformed TD
sequences and RF-DNA sequences, when used for the CBAD process, did not meet the performance benchmark. The GRLVQI process using
TD feature and Correlation Domain (CD) input sequences met benchmark of EERB≤10.0% at SNR=15.0 dB. At SNR=15.0 dB an
average EER≈1.3% was achieved for TD sequences as compared to an average EER≈1.6% for the CD sequences. While the EER value for
TD sequences is 0.3% lower than CD sequences, the TD sequence has nearly 16 times the number of elements as the CD sequence and a
correspondingly greater amount of computational resources would be required in an operational implementation.
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